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Advocates of "open access" claim that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should be 
able to use a cable TV system's bandwidth on the same terms offered to ISPs owned by 
the cable system.  On that view, "open access" mitigates a monopoly bottleneck and 
encourages the growth of broadband.  This paper shows that cable operators do enjoy 
market power, and do seek to leverage a dominant position in video into the broadband 
access market by allocating too little bandwidth for Internet access.  Yet, rather than 
protect cable operators from cannibalizing their cable TV revenue, this strategy defends 
against imposition of common carrier regulation, which would allow system capacity to 
be appropriated by regulators and rival broadband networks.  Ironically, the push for 
"open access" limits Internet access by encouraging this under-allocation of broadband 
spectrum, and by introducing coordination problems slowing technology deployment.   
These effects are empirically evident in the competitive superiority of cable's "closed" 
platform vis-a-vis "open” DSL networks, and in financial market reactions to key 

































The Political Economy of Cable “Open Access” 
 





  Federal and municipal regulators are considering rules to insure that cable television 
operators share their systems’ broadband transport functionality with independent 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
1 Such rules would presumably render exclusive 
contracts between cable television systems and their subsidiary ISPs illegal, perhaps 
affecting a sharp change in market structure. Subscribers wishing to access the Internet 
using the high speed connection available over the local cable TV “broadband”
  2 conduit 
would no longer have to subscribe through the exclusive agent selected (and often 
owned) by the cable operator. 
  A fiery debate rages over “open access.” The term––modified as “forced access” by 
some––spawns as much confusion as light. Cable companies profess to favor access for 
all retail and wholesale customers.
3 What divides are the details. How much will cable 
systems charge? How much control over technical standards and operating rules will 
cable systems maintain? How will upgraded services be provided? How will content 
revenues be generated and shared? 




1 The ISP access rules agreed to by the Federal Trade Commission and the merging parties in the AOL 
Time Warner deal provide an outline of what such a policy may look like.  A key part is “the ‘most favored 
nation’ clause which will enable any non-affiliated ISPs to gain access to cable systems on the same terms 
and rates as AOL has secured.”  Comment of Rich Bond, openNET Coalition Co-director, openNET 
Coalition Applauds Open Access Requirements in AOL-Time Warner Consent Agreement, Calls for a 
National Policy to Apply to All Cable Operators, openNET Coalition Press Release (Dec. 14, 2000), 
www.opennetcoalition.org/news/976830688.shtml.   
2  The Federal Communications Commission defines “high speed” Internet access as a connection in 
excess of 200 Kbps downstream (from the network to the end user), and “broadband” Internet access as a 
connection in excess of 200 Kbps both upstream and downstream.  Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of 
Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and 
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, CC Docket No. 98-146, Report, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398 (1999) (Section 706 Report), ¶ 20. 
3  “Our members are not opposed to working with unaffiliated ISPs, but they just do not want the 
government telling them that they have to provide access at below-market rates.”  Comment of American 
Cable Association (trade group representing small U.S. cable system operators) President Matt Polka, in 
Ted Hearn & Mike Farrell, FTC Builds a Model: AOL Access Terms Could Resonate, MULTICHANNEL 




  Diametrically opposite positions characterize the access issue as elementary. Lemley 
& Lessig express frustration over, “the great lengths to which the FCC and so many 
commentators are willing to go to justify the behavior of cable companies.”
4 But there is 
not much to debate: “In our view, ‘open access’ is simply a short hand for a set of 
competitive objectives.”
5 The authors warn that ISP exclusivity, which “serves no good 
end,”
6 is both damaging and virulent. If not checked by regulation, it will likely spread to 
emerging broadband access products offered by satellite and fixed wireless providers 
who may “decide to maximize profits by closing off access to ISPs, just as cable 
companies have done.”
7 
  Owen & Rosston (1998) see just the reverse simplicity: “even the threat… of 
government regulation, such as… mandatory unbundling… will chill the appetites of 
investors and reduce the pace of telecommunications infrastructure construction.”
8 They 
see regulated “open access” as destroying efficient forms of integration. “[B]ecause of 
the complexity of network arrangements, the argument that unbundling or nonexclusivity 
would have no effect on investment incentives, quality and consumer welfare is simply 
wrong.”
9 
  “Simply” competition––or “simply wrong”? Merging such disparate perspectives 
may be beyond the explanatory ability of this paper, but perhaps the gap can be 
narrowed. This paper offers b oth a theoretical explanation of the behavior of cable 
television companies, and an empirical assessment of the likely effects of “open access.” 
The view of “open access” regulation that emerges does not depend on how rapidly new 
competition emerges in the cable/broadband space,
10 and is entirely consistent with the 
                                                 
4 Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig,  The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the 
Internet in the Broadband Era, Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics, 
Working Paper No. 207 (2000), 57.   
5 Ibid., 58. 
6 Ibid., 38. 
7  Ibid., 37.  
8 Bruce M. Owen and Gregory L. Rosston, Cable Modems, Access and Investment Incentives, study for 
the National Cable Television Association (Dec. 1998), ii. 
9  Ibid., 2. 
10  Head-to-head cable/broadband competition may emerge, as shown by Gerald F. Faulhaber and 
Christiaan Hogendorn, The Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications, 48 J. OF INDUS. E CON. 




current perspective that broadband access is a distinct market dominated by incumbent 
cable operators.
11 The crux of our analysis is as follows: 
 
•  Cable operators possess substantial market power in subscription video 
markets. Moreover, they use this leverage to restrict output in broadband 
access. This is not profitable in a narrow financial calculus, but is rational due 
to strategic considerations.   
•  Vertically extending cable market power by restricting the availability of 
spectrum protects against appropriation by regulators or rival networks. 
Regulatory regimes are distinct for video, explicitly ruled not to be a common 
carrier service, and broadband Internet access, a passive transportation 
function. A profit-maximizing pricing structure in video cannot co-exist with 
unbundling and cost-based pricing. Notably, the “open access” movement is 
itself an attempt to impose common carriage regulation on cable systems.  
•  Non-discriminatory ISP mandates do not attack the cable monopoly 
problem. Cable operators will continue to allocate spectrum within their 
broadband pipes so as to protect video subscription revenues. Limits on 
transport capacity are placed on all ISPs without discrimination.  
•  Extensive regulatory history strongly suggests that more ambitious 
controls on cable television infrastructure are unlikely to achieve desired 
effects. These lessons include those gleaned from retail price regulation, 
leased access, must-carry, video dialtone, and open video systems.  
•  “Open access” rules discourage broadband network development and 
lessen functionality “end-to-end.” Mandatory unbundling of cable modem 
service invites coordination problems, producing observable disinvestment. 
Cable modem service, provided on “closed” platforms, leads the bandwidth 
                                                 
11  As argued in Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak, and Hal J. Singer, Residential Demand for 
Broadband Telecommuniations and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 Y ALE 




race against DSL’s “open” platform. A financial event study further reveals 
that shares of Internet infrastructure suppliers and content producers decline in 
value with news that “open access” rules are advancing in the courts, 
legislatures, or regulatory agencies.  
 
2. Market Power in Cable and Broadband 
 
Incumbent cable television systems generally possess dominant positions in local 
video distribution markets and earn monopoly rents. One way to appraise these rents is to 
compare the actual costs of tangible capital with the market value of assets in place, the q 
ratio.
12 For the cable television industry as a whole, average capital costs and system 
values (per subscriber) are displayed in Figure 1. Investors are willing to pay several 
times as much for a cable television system as they would for the physical assets that 
comprise it.
13 The large differential has existed over a number of years and suggests, even 
when good will and survivor bias are accounted for, indicating the presence of monopoly 
power.
14 
How does this dominance in video distribution impact the broadband ISP market? 
The physical infrastructure used to distribute video programming to subscribers is 
relatively efficient at also providing Internet access to both cable subscribers and non-
subscribers in areas passed by cable plant (over 95% of U.S. television households
15). 
This has proven very exciting news over the past several years to cable system owners, 
who had seen their equity values languish prior to the broadband bump beginning about 
1997. (Note in Figure 1 that the post-deregulation boom in cable system values stalled 
                                                 
12 Where q = market value of assets/replacement cost of tangible capital.  This value is about one in a 
highly competitive industry. 
13 In 1994, the capital cost per subscriber was $538.  Federal Communications Commission.  Annual 
Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming: First 
Annual Report, CS Docket No. 94-48 (rel. Sept. 28, 1994) (First Cable Report), Table 5.2.  In 1999, the per 
subscriber cost of upgraded cable plant was placed at $800 - $1,000.  FCC, Section 706 Report, Chart 2.   
14 See discussion in Chapter Three of Thomas W. Hazlett and Matthew L. Spitzer, Public Policy Toward 
Cable Television (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
15 Federal Communications Commission, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for 
the Delivery of Video Programming: Seventh Annual Report, CS Docket No. 00-132 (rel. Jan. 8, 2001) 




with recession [1990] and re-regulation [1992], but rebounded strongly in the late 1990s.) 
There is little doubt that the opportunity to add significant broadband access revenues 
drove this revaluation,
  16 while capital costs were increasing by about $460 per video 
subscriber.
17 


































Note: 2000-1 = Jan. – June 2000.  
Sources. Values: Hazlett & Spitzer, supra note 14, 22; FCC, First Cable Report, Table B-
9; FCC, Seventh Cable Report, Table B-8. Costs: See footnote 13. 
 
 
Cable system operators are faced with the question as to how these projected 
broadband revenues can best be captured. Large investments must be made to upgrade 
cable systems to be capable of providing two-way broadband. Typically, systems upgrade 
by installing more sophisticated electronics and rewiring existing cable plant, running 
high capacity fiber optic lines to neighborhood “nodes.” Users in these nodes share the 
local coaxial cable grid connecting their computers to the nearby fiber optic link. The 
                                                 
16 Reviewing 1999 economic performance, cable industry analyst Paul Kagan wrote, “[T]he real story is in 
the new services sector… High-speed-data revenue grew 186.9% to $482 million with 1.4 mil. customers 
across the nation, up from 600,000 a year ago.”  Cable TV Financial Databook (Carmel, CA: Paul Kagan 
Associates; July 2000), 6. 
17 “According to Excite@Home, in order to provide broadband services, the cable industry will need to 
spend… $31 billion to upgrade their systems to reach all homes passed.”  Federal Communications 
Commission,  Broadband Today, a Staff Report to William E. Kennard, Chairman, Federal 




more subscribers per node, the slower the service. The expense of building additional 
nodes forces a price-performance trade-off on the network owner.  
Having some notion of the shape and magnitude of this trade-off, the cable system 
estimates a range of cash flows it might receive from offering broadband access before 
undertaking a series of investment decisions to upgrade plant. The “open access” 
controversy enters just here, as investment is intrinsically linked to cash flows anticipated 
from broadband service. What corporate policy––internal provision or outside 
contracting––will extract maximum profits from the ancillary service?  
 
3. Vertical Leveraging from Cable to Broadband 
 
Unlike the real spectrum limitations of the telco wire, the scarcity of cable broadband 
is artificial––i.e., a purely commercial allocation choice by the cable industry.
18 
The two largest broadband ISPs, @Home and RoadRunner (RR), each served about 
one million broadband subscribers as of mid-2000.
19 No other broadband access provider 
was even one-half as large.
20 Either firm is substantially owned by cable system operators 
(@Home by AT&T; RR by both AT&T and Time Warner). Under “open access,” ISPs 
owned by cable companies remain eligible to link customers to broadband access service 
provided over a parent’s infrastructure, but the same terms of transport are available to 
ISP competitors not owned by the parent. Eliminating exclusive relationships is 
recommended to promote ISP competition and keep the Internet open “end-to-end.”
21 
Perhaps cable companies should welcome “open access.” Jeffrey Mackie-Mason cites 
the endorsement of “third party access” by Canadian cable television companies as 
evidence that promoting ISP competition will enhance cable firms’ profits.
  22 He argues 
                                                 
18 Scott C. Cleland, Residential Broadband Outlook: Investment Implications of a Duopoly? PRECURSOR 
GROUP INDEPENDENT RESEARCH (Aug. 11, 2000). 
19 @Home finished 2000-II with 1.1 million subscribers, RR with 900,000.  NCTA Reports Fast Growth in 
Cable Modem, Telephony Rollouts, TELECOM. REPORTS DAILY (July 26, 2000).   
20 The largest DSL provider, SBC, served 319,000 subscribers at the end of 2000-II.  Verizon had 176,000, 
Quest 140,000, and BellSouth 59,2000.  Company reports. 
21  As argue Lemley & Lessig, supra note 4. 
22  He quotes a Canadian government document:  “The Canadian Cable Television Association is 
committed to the implementation of third party access, in large part because it is in the cable companies’ 
financial interests.”  Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason,  Investment in Cable  Broadband Infrastructure: Open 




that, “open access will not reduce the value of broadband last-mile transport 
infrastructure.” However, in endorsing access regulation, he implies that managers of 
U.S. cable firms must be forced to maximize profits. The further implication is that cable 
firm shareholders should sue company managers, perhaps awarding a share of monetary 
damages with regulators as a finder’s fee. 
Cable companies do benefit from  robust competition in complementary goods and 
services. Independent ISPs that bring customers to the cable system by reselling its 
capacity apply additional marketing effort that, ceteris paribus, bolster cable company 
profits. But the key issue immediately arises: what prices and terms will be set for 
access? Where the cable company negotiates an access contract at arms length, the firm 
evinces the judgment that it can most efficiently promote its product by “hiring” inputs 
outside the firm.  
 
 
Table 1. U.S. Residential Broadband Market as of December 31, 2000 
 
Bandwidth (MHz)  Subscribers  Fee ($)  Speed (bps)  Access Mode 
Available  Allocated 
to access 
000s  %  Initial  Monthly  Down   Up 
Cable   750  6  4,72
5 
73  75  40  ~2M  128-
500K 
xDSL  
(ILECs, CLECs, IXCs) 
1  1  1,71
0 
26  100  40-50  ~768K  128-
256K 
Overbuilder (RCN)  860  6  67  1  0  40  ~1.5M  ~768K 
Satellite (Hughes DirecPC)  n.a.  n.a.  35  <1  215  50  ~400K  ~28-
56K 
MMDS (fixed wireless)  198  ~198  1  < 1  150  40  ~1M  ~256K 
PCS/WCS (fixed wireless)  10  10  10  < 1  0  35  ~500K  ~150K 
                 
TOTAL SUBS      6,54
8 
100         












Cannibalization and the Vertical Leveraging Fallacy 
This is the fundamental trade-off between internally producing inputs versus relying 
on the market.
23 A firm with monopoly power in one layer of a vertical production chain 
may face incentives to integrate up or down (as we discuss in the context this market 
below), but as a general matter it is not true that vertical expansion is a concomitant of 
profit-maximization. A stark illustration is offered by comparing the returns accruing to 
the initial shareholders in Apple, a firm that chose to internalize many layers of hardware 
and software production in personal computers, to the fortunes garnered by investors in 
Microsoft, which narrowly focused on the production of essential software components.
24 
There is a crucial horizontal issue that arises, however. Cable television systems in 
the United States were worth over $6,000 per subscriber in 2000.
25 This value is based on 
expectations of distinct profit streams. First, there is the video subscription business, or 
plain old cable (POC). Next come the burgeoning services of high-speed access (HSA) 
and cable telephony. In 2000, the industry garnered about $42 billion in revenues.
26 As 
seen in Table 2, which excludes minor revenues from business services, cable system 
owners are heavily dependent on POC revenues now and for years to come. While 
telephone revenues are expected to rise rapidly over the next decade, traditional video 
subscription service is projected to continue generating over two-thirds of industry 







                                                 
23  Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).   
24  This story has been told in many places, but perhaps the best documented – and most painful to long-
term shareholders of Apple – is found in Jim Carlton, Apple: The Inside Story of Intrigue, Egomania, and 
Business Blunders (New York: Times Books, 1997).  
25  In system sales during January through June, 2000, the average sales price was $6,259 per subscriber.  
FCC, Seventh Cable Report, Table B-8. 





Table 2. Sources of Cable Television Industry Revenues, 1999––2010 
 
$bil. Annual Revenue in:  Service 
1999  2000  2001  2010 
Traditional Cable (includes local ad, 
games, home shopping, equipment, 









Residential High-speed Access  0.5  1.2  2.3  6.8 
Residential Telephony  0.1  0.5  1.2  20.1 
    Source: Cable TV Financial Databook (Carmel, CA: Paul Kagan Assoc.; July 2000), 10-11. 
 
 
Critics of cable’s exclusive contracts with affiliated ISPs have cited the potential 
competition between cable and broadband delivery systems as a predicate for regulation.  
The argument is that cable operators will not permit broadband access service to 
undermine their existing cable market power; i.e., they will stifle efforts to develop 
video-streaming and related technologies. “By gaining control over the network 
architecture…,” Lemley & Lessig write, “cable providers are in a position to affect 
development of the architecture so as to minimize the threat of broadband to their own 
video market. For example, a broadband cable provider that has control over the ISPs its 
customers use might be expected to restrict customers’ access to streaming video from 
competitive content sources, in order to preserve its market of traditional cable video. 
AT&T has just announced such a policy.”
27  
Opponents of “open access” counter that this argument falls prey to the “monopoly 
leveraging” fallacy.
28 The cable monopolist should not fear competition from 
complementary (vertical) markets because it is free to extract consumer benefits flowing 
from the newly available “substitute” by pricing access to the broadband conduit.
29 
Whether subscriber dollars end up in the “video” pocket or the “broadband” pocket, they 
still flow to the cable operator.  
                                                 
27 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 4, 25. 
28 James B. Speta,  The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access,  71 U NIV. C OLO. L. R EV. 975 (Fall 
2000), 1005. 
29 More sophisticated economic models theorize about tying (analogous to offering high-speed modem 
customers just one ISP choice).  The effect on consumers is highly sensitive to the assumptions made about 




In Figure 2, we illustrate this basic concept by charting the revenues available to a 
cable operator in a hypothetical market with one hundred households. The firm, we 
assume, maximizes profit by charging $40 per month to 70 cable (video) subscribers, and 
$40 a month to 25 broadband access (cable modem) subscribers. Total monthly revenues 
are $4200. We assume that profit margins are equal across service. The “monopoly 
leveraging” story is that the cable operator seeks to restrict use of broadband to protect 
cash flows from video.
30 Lemley & Lessig believe that this alone is sufficient incentive 
for the cable executives to limit broadband access. But as Speta notes, there is a logical 
problem with this claim, and it is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 2.  








Cable Operator Revenues = $4,200
100 Households
10 Cable      













                                                                                                                                                 
DeGraba,  Why Lever Into A Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 5 J. OF  ECON. & 
MGT. STRAT. 433 (Fall 1996). 
30 “When asked whether users of the AT&T/MediaOne network would be permitted to stream video from 
competing providers across their network, Internet Services President Daniel Somers is reported to have 
said that AT&T didn’t spend $56 billion to get into the cable business ‘to have the blood sucked out of our 
vein.’”  Lemley & Lessig, supra note 4, 25-26. 




Here we chart the same market: identical costs and demands as in Figure 2. But now 
the cable operator pursues a different strategy, allowing customers the freedom to migrate 
out of video subscriptions, obtaining substitute programming via high-speed Internet 
access. Suppose, for example, that cable modem users employ RealNetworks software to 
download video programs from Broadcast.com, Disney.com, Discovery.com, 
AtomicFilms.com, and C -SPAN.org. The broadband connection satisfies what was 
previously a demand for a multi-channel video subscription, which broadband 
subscribers drop. Yet, cable companies are unhurt. Because downloaded services and 
content flow through their conduit, cable system operators capture the full value of their 
service by pricing access (or through-put) accordingly. This is done by charging HSA 
subscribers with access to Internet video $80, just the “cable + broadband” package price 
when services were sold separately. POC-only and HSA-only customers continue to pay 
$40 monthly, and system revenues (and profits) are unchanged. It is not necessary for 
cable operators to own broadband applications, provide the services, or––most 
importantly––limit customer access to web sites in order for cable systems to extract the 
gains from providing transport to desirable locations. And the existence of a competitor 
in the broadband access market, here DSL, does not alter the logic. 
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A standard problem with above calculus, however, is that it involves price 
discrimination. Firms may have difficulty executing such a strategy where consumers are 
difficult to segment (say, because customers in distinct demand segments are difficult to 
identify, or because arbitrage between segments is easy). It may then be profitable to 
extend a monopoly into upstream or downstream product markets. Notable examples 
include cases where firms tie input purchases to capital equipment. By setting an above-
market rate for an input highly correlated with usage, intense users (likely to be relatively 
inelastic demanders) can be charged more per unit than light users. A classic example 
was the IBM punch card arrangement. The computer maker originally leased its 
machines, requiring lessees to purchase tabulating cards from IBM. The cards were 
priced significantly above competitive cost, and metered demand. The scheme allowed 
IBM to distribute a large number of computers (with relatively low lease payments), 
while capturing differential payments: intense (and relatively inelastic) demanders would 
buy more cards than lighter users.
31   
  In the cable modem market, however, customer classes can be separated by quality of 
service. Those attempting video downloads require very high capacity. This can be (and 
is) priced as a distinct class of service.
32 Arbitrage between classes is also difficult, given 
that access is a service rather than a fungible product. Moreover, cable operators are able 
to monitor traffic and to limit uses inimical to company policies. For instance, cable 
modem users are routinely barred from operating commercial web sites, offering e -
commerce services, or engaging in prolonged video streaming. In short, cable operators 
                                                 
31 “Under Department of Justice pressure, IBM agreed to ‘cease and desist’ its dual practice of only 
renting hardware and of requiring the purchase of its own cards.”  Kenneth W. Clarkson and Roger LeRoy 
Miller, Industrial Organization: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1982), 275.  
Chicken Delight crafted a similar pricing structure, franchising retail fast food outlets at zero royalty 
payment but maintaining an ex clusive contract to supply fryers, buckets, and other key inputs at prices 
significantly above those of competitors.  Chicken Delight’s tying arrangement was found to have violated 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9
th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied 405 U.S. 955 (1972). 
32 Business broadband services routinely price according to bandwidth offered customers, and cable 
systems specifically note that various speeds can be offered subscribers.  “Some consumers want a fast 
enough service, others want a really fast service, and some want an incredibly fast service, and there’s a 
different price associated with each one of those tiers.”  Comment of Susan Marshall, AT&T Broadband, in 




appear to control their pricing structures such that vertical integration into adjacent 
broadband access services is unnecessary for profit maximization.  
 
Allocating Cable System Spectrum 
State-of-the art cable systems allocate one video channel for broadband access, and 
this conduit is shared by 500 home clusters called “nodes.”  See Figure 4. Greater 
bandwidth could be economically delivered in at least two ways. First, fewer homes 
could be required to share the local area network (LAN) formed by a cable node. 
Standard cable architecture allows systems to create nodes with just 75 subscribers.
33 A 
competitor in local cable television markets, RCN, uses an architectural standard 
featuring 125 homes per node.
34  In general, cable competitors (“overbuilders”) 
effectively under-price monopoly systems by allotting users substantially higher system 
capacity for broadband.
35  
                                                 
33 Ibid., 182, 253. 
34 “Included in the overbuilder’s [RCN’s] network plans are usually 860 MHz versus 750 MHz plant 
capacity, fiber taken down to node sizes of 125 or so homes, instead of 500 or more, and in some cases new 
technologies to allow much faster data speeds than the typical upgraded cable system is providing.”  Cable 
Overbuilders – Down but Not Out, Media Week, CREDIT SUISSE/FIRST BOSTON EQUITY RESEARCH (Feb. 
12, 2001), 3. 
35 An overbuilder in Denver, WideOpenWest, is a good example.  “High-speed data is the centerpiece of 
WideOpenWest’s business plan, and where [a company spokesman] expects to ‘blow [incumbent] AT&T out of 
the water.’  The company’s plant…allows for a capability of up to 3 megabits per second, both upstream and 
downstream…By comparison, AT&T can deliver 1.5 megabits downstream but just 156 kilobits upstream…” 




Figure 4. Standard 750 MHz Cable System Architecture




















  Second, cable systems could increase broadband access speeds by allocating more 
spectrum. The standard downstream allotment of just one video channel, 6 MHz, 
comprises less than 1% of the bandwidth in a 750 MHz cable system.
36 See Figure 5. 
While bandwidth cannot be requisitioned seamlessly when video services are jointly 
provided due to leakage and potential interference, a substantially higher percentage can 
be utilized for broadband access without incurring substantial depreciation in network 
functionality. For instance, Maxwell notes that 750 MHz cable systems delivering 78 
channels of video programming are free to use the 37 MHz for digital upstream 
                                                 
36 By 2000, 92% of Time Warner’s cable plant was equipped to provide 2-way service over 750 MHz, 
while 70% of AT&T’s plant was similarly equipped.  These are the two largest U.S. cable system 
operators.  Leslie Ellis, What Slowdown? Cable Construction Steady through 2002, BROADBAND WEEK 1 









Figure 5. CATV Spectrum Allocation
38 
 
   
This spectrum allocation appears economically inefficient. The standard basic cable 
television package in the U.S. features 45 channels of programming, producing revenues 
of about $29.86 per month per subscriber.
39 The most popular channels (ESPN, CNN, 
Nickelodean, TBS, A&E and Lifetime) are far more important (measured in viewing 
share or license fees paid by cable operators) than the least watched (Headline News, 
Animal Planet, the Food Channel, the Travel Channel).
40 Assume that the revenue 
generated by a cable channel is a reasonable proxy for the value it delivers cable 
operators.
 41 
                                                 
37 Kim Maxwell, Residential Broadband (New York: Wiley, 1999), 244.  Upstream transmissions are more 
difficult to expand into adjacent spectrum, as noise problems develop.  Yet, upstream demands are far less 
intense, as individual web surfers send far less data than they receive.  Indeed, many cable modems are 
one-way, with upstream connections provided through dial-up modems utilizing telephone lines (speeds of 
less than 56Kbps).  Most important is the fact that Internet video relies on downstream bandwidth. 
38  Diagram found in Maxwell, supra note 37, 179. 
39    Cable TV Financial Databook (2000), supra note 26, 10.  The analysis focuses on the cost of 
reallocating basic cable channels to high-speed Internet access. Premium channels, pay-per-view, and 
digital TV channels could also be reallocated.   As returns will be equal across services for profit 
maximization, however, the examined trade-off yields general results. 
40 ESPN costs cable systems 93 cents per subscriber per month on the basic rate card for 2000, while 
Animal Planet costs just 10 cents.  Ibid., 60-61. 
41 This assumes roughly constant profit margins across channels.  The analysis ignores local ad sales by 




To deliver cable broadband, standard cable systems use one video channel of 
bandwidth and achieve revenues of $40 per subscriber per month.
42 But there are many 
fewer subscribers to HSA than to POC. Nationwide there were about 4.7 million cable 
modem subs at year-end 2000, as opposed to about 68 million cable subs. At current 
levels of utilization, then, cable modem users are j ust 6.9% as numerous as POC 
customers.  This ratio is projected to rise rapidly.
43  
While the average cable channel yields 66 cents per subscriber monthly ($29.86/45), 
the one channel devoted to HSA yields $2.76 ($40 x 0.069) per cable subscriber per 
month. It is highly likely that the marginal channel devoted to cable generates far less 
than the average, given the steep drop-off seen in license fees for less popular 
programming. It is conceivable that the marginal value of additional spectrum deployed 
in broadband access also falls rapidly, making reallocation uneconomic. But it is a near 
certainty that more intense utilization of shared broadband will dramatically increase the 
value of spectrum used for Internet access over time. Using the 2005 projection for cable 
modem penetration yields an approximation of broadband access revenue of $11.36 ($40 
x 0.284) per cable subscriber per month. Because investments made today (or yesterday) 
will determine the configuration of cable systems (including bandwidth allocation) in 
Year 2005, the evidence strongly suggests that cable operators are exceedingly 
conservative in allocating spectrum to broadband access and (equivalently) exceedingly 
generous in preserving bandwidth for plain old cable.
44 
Spectrum is under-allocated to high-speed access in the cable system. But the 
“@Home/RoadRunner contract structure”––which we take to refer to the exclusive 
contracting provisions––is not the hoarding device. Take the limits on video streaming 
that Cleland, Lemley & Lessig, and others have criticized as symptomatic of the need for 
“open access,”
45 while cable companies respond that the rules protect shared bandwidth.
46 
                                                 
42 Cable TV Financial Databook (2000), supra note 26, 10. 
43 To 28.4% in 2005.  Ibid.   
44 “It is surprising that there has been no discussion of why cable decided to allocate only 6 of its 750 MHz 
of spectrum (1 of 125 channels) to the supposedly high growth broadband data market….  Scarcity 
increases pricing power and protects core cable revenues from Internet video competitors.  Scarcity also 
effectively limits speeds to roughly DSL range to foster some competition and postpone inevitable non-
discriminatory access requirements.”  Cleland, supra note 18. 
45 Lemley & Lessig note that, “Legacy monopolies” impose rules to “protect their own ‘turf’,” citing limits 




Either explanation is compatible with cable exerting market power in the underlying 
subscription video market, and  neither explains how “open access” would reduce that 
market power. Indeed, under a non-discrimination policy allowing independent ISPs use 
of cable’s conduits on the same terms offered affiliated ISPs, the video streaming time 
limits would remain in effect.
47 
One interesting development is that cable TV systems are aggressively upgrading 
from analog to digital transmission.
48 Driven by competition from satellite TV providers, 
digital cable delivers far larger packages of video channels. Already, 80% of U.S. cable 
homes have access to digital services,
49 and over 11 million subscribe. By 2005, this 
number is forecast to reach 44.6 million.
50 Two points are key: (1) Lots of Spectrum is 
being reallocated from analog to digital. (2) “Most industry executives point to VOD 
[Video on Demand] as digital cable’s ‘killer app,’ as it allows consumers to watch 
content on demand and employs VCR-type features such as fast-forward, rewind and 
pause capabilities.”
51 This is the cable-encapsulated version of “streaming video.” The 
purpose of cable operators in pushing digital cable and video-on-demand, while starving 
broadband access: Keep content “on network.” Ironically, “open access” demands 




                                                                                                                                                 
46 While cable companies’ interest in explaining away monopolistic practices is real enough, there are 
substantial sharing issues which maintain plausibility for such claims.  This is seen in the occasional limits 
placed on video streaming over DSL.  John Borland, Pac Bell Puts Speed Limits on Some DSL Customers, 
CNET NEWS.COM (June 30, 2000), http:www.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-2176366.html.   
47 Excite @Home’s network architect Milo Medin has commented:  “I was sitting next to [AOL CEO] 
Steve Case in Congress during the open access debates.  He was saying that all AOL wanted was to be 
treated like ExciteAtHome.  If he wants to be treated like us, I’m sure he could cut a deal with [the cable 
networks], but they’ll take their pound of flesh.  We only had to give them a 75 percent equity stake in the 
company and board control.  The cable guys aren’t morons.”  Quoted in, Jason Krause, Switching Teams on 
Open Access?  THE STANDARD (http:www.thestandard.com/article/display/1,1153,8903,00.html). 
48 John M. Higgins, Digital Cable: Ready to Hatch, BROADCASTING & CABLE (March 19, 2001), 64. 
49  Geraldine Fabrikant and Seth Schiesel, Satellite vs. Cable: A Rivalry Beyond TV, NY TIMES (Feb. 19, 
2001), C1. 




Appropriation by regulation 
While many firms elect to serve all customers without discrimination as a profit-
maximizing strategy, being subject to common carrier regulations may limit asset value.
52 
Restrictions attendant to carrier regulation include the imposition of rate controls, limits 
on vertical integration, and forced cross-subsidies (as when high-cost customers are 
mandated to be served at prices equal to those charged low-cost customers). By removing 
flexibility in pricing and operations, such regulations limit profitability, particularly as 
they impose political uncertainties on risky investments. As a result, firms often battle 
common carrier status. “Telecom providers and regulators engage in an endless minuet 
that moves dancers in or out of the circle called ‘common carriage.’”
53 
The separation of content and conduit dramatically lowers the transactions costs 
associated with imposing common carrier regulation. This reality has been long reflected 
in public policies that have attempted to limit common carrier rules (and rate regulation) 
to open access platforms. One obvious example: phone systems have been historically 
rate regulated, whereas radio and television broadcasters have not. An exception that 
proves the rule is provided by retail rate controls on cable television systems. Imposed in 
the 1992 Cable Act, they were ultimately judged a failure by policy makers and 
analysts.
54 Regulating a complex set of video services, which cable operators can 
repackage and retier at will, proved overwhelming. Congress eliminated c able rate 
regulation in the 1996 Telecommunications Act in deference to this reality. (See 
discussion below.)
  
The cable television industry has long teetered on the edge of common carrier status. 
Cable interests have vigorously sought to avoid it, seeing such regulation as detrimental 
to asset values. The earliest attempts to regulate cable television at the federal level came 
in two separate FCC staff recommendations that cable television be considered a 
                                                                                                                                                 
51  R. Thomas Umstead, VOD Takes Content Hit: Buena Vista Pulls Titles, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Feb. 
12, 2001), 1. 
52  Federal Express, Earthlink, and United Airlines elect a “common carrier” business model without 
regulation. 
53  John Thorne, Peter W. Huber, and Michael K. Kellog, Federal Broadband Law (Boston: Little Brown, 
1995), 292. 




common carrier service. Both were rejected by the Commission.
55 It is of note that the 
1958 petition setting the staff in motion was filed by 13 TV broadcasters who “concluded 
that the infant cable industry threatened television’s economic security”.
56 Cable 
operators lobbied for, and obtained, a statutory determination that they were not common 
carriers, in the 1984 Cable Communications Policy Act.
57 This delineation was reaffirmed 
in the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
58   
Despite cable’s definitional success, aspects of carriage have been regulated. Cable 
operators have been required to lease channel capacity to independent program providers 
since 1972. Broadcast station owners succeeded in getting the FCC to enact “must carry” 
rules, awarding local TV stations priority channel assignments (at zero cost) on cable 
systems. When must carry was overturned on First Amendment grounds by federal courts 
in 1985 and again in 1987, broadcasters turned to Congress. There they won must carry 
rights in the 1992 Cable Act, upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting 
v. FCC.
59  
When telephone companies have received federal permission to deliver cable 
television service, it has been under common carrier rules such as “video dialtone” and 
“open video service.” “Common carrier cable service was thus defined and approved, but 
defined in such a way as to make the established wireline common carrier lose interest in 
providing it.”
60 When seen historically and examined in the context of other 
communications industries, it is clear cable television operators have adroitly side-
stepped onerous common carriage regulation without escaping the threat. Referring to 
cable TV’s origins as “CATV,” or community antenna television, a legal treatise notes: 
“The ‘community antenna’ began life in the legal slums of common carriage and has 
never quite shaken off its past”.
61 
That broadband access appears to fall into a distinct regulatory category from that 
governing cable’s multi-channel video subscription service has already found its way into 
                                                 
55 See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., American Broadcasting and the First Amendment, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987), Ch. 12. 
56 Thorne et al., supra note 53, 317. 
57 1984 Cable Communications Policy Act (47 U.S.C.A. §541[c]) 
58 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, Sec 651 (a)(2). 
59 520 US 180 (1997). 
60 Thorne at al., supra note 53, 321 (footnote omitted).   




law. In an important ruling by the U.S. 9
th Circuit Court of Appeals in June 2000, AT&T 
successfully challenged an “open access” cable modem law imposed on their franchise 
transfer from TCI.
62 The ruling was based on the court’s finding that broadband access 
was not “cable service,” which is regulated (with certain federal preemptions) at the local 
franchise level, but “telecommunications service.” The latter is common carrier service 
falling under federal jurisdiction. While the 9
th Circuit thereby prohibited the Portland 
city government from imposing “ open access,” a cable trade journal reports the danger 
for AT&T in winning this battle: “If high-speed data is really a telecom service, that 
means it’s subject to regulation from the FCC. Thus, cable’s bittersweet Portland 
victory.”
63 Now the United States Supreme Court, hearing an appeal of the Portland case, 
may open the door to common carrier regulation of cable broadband.
64  
Regulators and influential interest groups are already moving to impose common 
carrier rules for cable broadband service. Cable operators have explicitly used their 
function as electronic publishers (delivering selected video networks directly to viewers) 
as a First Amendment defense against “open access” requirements.
65 A more vigorous 
transition by cable operators could lead to the d evelopment of web-based services 
including video-streaming and other substitutes for networks now packaged for 
customers by cable system operators, exposing cable assets to intensified demands for 
common carrier regulation. As a report by two Wall Street consulting firms noted in 
2000: 
Unlike the telcos, which are regulated as common carriers, cable currently suffers 
neither interconnection nor unbundling nor mandatory resale obligations. As cable has 
moved into two-way services, however, the distinctions between the two carrier groups 
                                                 
62  ATT v. City of Portland, Case No: 99-35609 (9
th Cir.; June 22, 2000). 
63  David Connell, The Long Road to Open Access, CABLE WORLD 14 (Feb. 12, 2001), 15.  
64   “Cable does not want to be regulated at all for its next-generation services.  It has avoided any 
regulatory classification so far.  But there is a Supreme Court case next year that is going to cause problems 
for cable in the sense the court may decide whether cable is really a telecom common carrier, a less-
regulated cable service or an unregulated information service…So it’s a positive outlook for cable with 
some very nagging concerns about how they make money with broadband and how they eventually will be 
regulated, or not regulated.” Comment by Scott Cleland in Sandra Ward, Telecom’s Future: Interview with 
Scott Cleland and William Whyman, BARRON’S Online (March 12, 2001). 
65 Indeed, cable operators have won a federal district court decision striking down “open access” 
requirements as violations of the right to freedom of the press.  Comcast Cablevision v. Broward Co., 




has begun to blur. Nonetheless, under the status quo, cable has thus enjoyed a benefit––
namely, freedom from regulation––relative to the telcos on high-speed services.
66 
Cable systems deter appropriation through defensive engineering. To pre-empt the 
imposition of common carrier regulation and free riding by competitive broadband 
networks potentially benefiting from the emergence of Internet TV, system operators 
impose “slow access” architecture. Regulators may yet attempt to impose common carrier 
rules, but chances of success are reduced. Note that even Federal Trade Commission 
rules in the AOL-Time Warner merger, hailed by “open access” champions,
67 failed to 
allocate additional bandwidth to broadband access.
68 
 
Appropriation via network effect 
The economic externality generated by moving to an integrated platform involves the 
effect of cable system investments in stimulating the emergence of broadband networks. 
Even if optimized for reception over cable conduits, the promotion of broadband content 
could benefit alternative distribution networks. In particular, DSL stands to gain from the 
emergence of Internet video.  Not only would DSL demand rise among web surfers as the 
quantity of popular broadband content increases, but demand rises as POC subscribers 
see DSL as a competing source of programming to multi-channel video subscriptions.
69 
By opening the cable system to receive Internet video, and by supporting (directly and 
                                                 
66 Broadband!, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. and McKinsey & Co. (Jan. 2000), 64. 
67  Larry Lessig,  The Rules of Politics,  THE  STANDARD (Jan. 12, 2001), 
www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,21427,00.html.  
68  It should also be noted that the FTC/AOL agreement failed to impose any “open access” requirements 
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Federal Trade Commission,  In the Matter of America Online and Time Warner: Decision and Order 
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69 DSL providers have already begun efforts to promote their networks as POC substitutes, even as the 
primitive state of video streaming (too clunky over existing delivery systems, including cable broadband 
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real-time video to Internet users, and hope that coming services will be competitive with cable television 
subscription service.  Brian Ploskina, DSL Providers Gird for Content War, INTER@CTIVE WEEK (July 24, 
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indirectly) the emergence of video content providers on the web,
70 the cable operator 
develops networks potentially shared with DSL competitors. 
One way to think of this is via the vertical competition model outlined by Tim 
Bresnahan.
71 In Bresnahan’s analysis, some industries witness rivalry between 
complementary products. This is counter-intuitive to the standard industrial organization 
framework that categorizes competitors as horizontal and complementary suppliers as 
vertical. The layered, or modular, aspect of emerging product markets (particularly in 
computers) lends plausibility to the new analysis, however. Numerous suppliers 
cooperate either explicitly or through arms length market transactions to serve customer 
needs. Within each product niche, one dominant supplier emerges. Yet competition rages 
between niches. 
  The application featured by Bresnahan, the personal computer, is apt.  The semi-
conductor product market is dominated by Intel. On top of this PC building blocks rests 
an operating system (OS), where Microsoft’s Windows is dominant. Atop Windows rest 
software applications provided by Microsoft and other rivals, including Netscape. 
Microsoft may face important competition from below––should Intel program greater 
functionality into its chips, or attempt to bundle its own operating system––and above, 
should Netscape attempt to provide OS-type functionality within its browserware. This is 
what the inclusion of Java programming language in Netscape Navigator had the 
potential to achieve. Of course, the ensuing skirmish (also known as the browser “jihad”) 
became the heart of U.S. v. Microsoft, still being litigated.    
  In the cable market, high-speed Internet access is supplied atop the underlying cable 
television video subscription service. Theoretically, cable broadband service could 
compete with the cable operator’s video offerings by delivering Internet TV.  Even at a 
price compensating cable operators for short-run revenue displacement, however, vertical 
                                                 
70 Websites dispensing video are experiencing difficulty in achieving financial success, and this feeds back 
to harm broadband access suppliers.  Speaking of the market exit of Icebox, a web-based video production 
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competition of this sort would support the creation of broadband applications that could 
be delivered over rival networks.  This lessens the “applications barrier to entry” (as 
the government calls Microsoft’s dominant popularity among software packages for PCs) 
helping to protect cable’s video subscription business from competitive attack by DSL 
providers. As depicted in Figures 2 and 3, the horizontal competitor in broadband (DSL) 
could grow by absorbing both broadband subscribers (under-pricing the discriminatory 
schedule put forward by cable operators to compensate for “cannibalization”) and cable 
video customers. Even if efficient on its own (narrow) terms, migrating customers from 
video subscriptions to broadband access (including video) risks empowering competitors 
to challenge cable’s lucrative video market head-to-head, something DSL has long 
(unsuccessfully) aimed to do.
72 
  One objection to this view is that only large cable companies would face such 
strategic considerations. Given the observation that scores of small (monopoly) cable 
firms pursue the identical path (and system engineering for broadband) as large, multiple 
system operators (MSOs) like AT&T, AOL Time Warner, Comcast, Cablevision, and 
Cox, an argument can be made that network externalities are a non-issue. Even if they 
were important to the industry’s large players, small operators should not fear triggering 
development of complementary network products. But for just this same reason, the gains 
available to small cable operators are small. Acting on the margins of the national 
programming market, small system owners do not anticipate that supplying cheap 
abundant broadband capacity will stimulate “killer apps” such as streaming video, video 
on demand, or Internet TV. 
  There is an objection, however, that is much more damaging. It is that, were large 
cable operators to launch a much more aggressive product in the broadband access space, 
they would severely undermine market demand for DSL. Already cable modem service 
maintains a nearly two-to-one advantage in residential subscribership. Were the 
quality/price trade-off to decisively shift to cable’s favor from this initial equilibrium, 
DSL would be neutered as a competitive threat until at least the next product cycle.  In 
the meanwhile, cable operators would enjoy overwhelming dominance in broadband 
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access service.  Hence, while strategic considerations relating to network externalities are 
of interest, it is difficult to see where they have thus far constrained investment choices 
by operators. Our analysis focuses on the much more immediate threat attending 
aggressive broadband access supply, appropriation by regulation. 
   
4. Profit Maximizing Vertical Restrictions 
 
I believe that these arguments fail, however, because they do not suggest any reason 
the cable companies would seek to protect video programming revenues instead of 
seeking new revenues from Internet service.
73 
The analysis in Section III provided such a reason. In short, political risks associated 
with such a transition undermine cable system efforts to capture the returns available 
from supplying subscribers an integrated, high performance data/video broadband 
package.  
Other vertical concerns have also been raised in the “open access” debate. 
Specifically, cable operators are accused of using their control of the broadband conduit 
to favor complementary services provided by operators. The prime example involves ISP 
connections. Where a cable operator owns an interest in a broadband ISP, it can favor 
that provider (e.g., through an exclusive contract), foreclosing competing ISPs. Profits 
may be realized through both subscription fees and the advantage gained in providing a 
“start-up screen” to web users.  Similarly, where an ISP selected by the cable operator 
promotes content (web sites) it owns, independent content providers may be placed at a 
disadvantage. 
There are at least four different reasons that cable operators would seek vertical 
integration (from cable conduit service provision to ISP connections). The first is to 
promote productive efficiency. The second is to eliminate monopoly in the 
complementary service. The third is t o enable price discrimination. The fourth is to 
impose impediments to competition in upstream or downstream markets. The first two 
situations imply consumer gains from vertical integration, and the third is ambiguous. 
                                                 




The fourth rationale presents the most interesting possibilities for anti-competitive 
conduct. We discuss them in order. 
 
Efficiency  
Where a downstream (upstream) supplier, with or without monopoly power, sees that 
it can provide an upstream (downstream) service at lower cost and/or higher quality than 
competitors, it has an incentive to provide that service. Barring special circumstances 
involving strategic behavior discussed below, the firm will have an incentive not to enter 
when it anticipates the reverse––that competitors are more efficient producers. Either 
way, the incentives of producers are aligned with those of consumers, who benefit from 
least-cost production. In cable modem service, efficient vertical integration could occur 
when, for example, a reseller who might invest too little  in promoting customer 
information and service quality, is replaced by a conduit owner that internalizes losses of 
reputation for both the specific cable system and for cable modem service generally.
74 
Product tying could also be efficient, eliminating customer confusion that arises when 
multiple vendors or resellers are involved in provisioning service.  
 
Prevention of double marginalization 
When a complement is produced by a monopolist, demand is reduced. If the firm in 
the primary market vertically integrates and succeeds in lowering the price of the 
complementary good or service, it increases demand in the primary market (and, hence, 
profits). The incentives of the primary market producer, competitor or monopolist, are 
symmetric with those of consumers.  
 
Price discrimination  
Integration into complementary product markets may assist a firm in segmenting 
customers. Indeed, as discussed in detail in Section III, cable firms do implicitly regulate 
the flow of a vital input (spectrum) into a potentially competitive service, broadband 
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access. Yet this integration takes place at the system engineering level. Access to the 
limited bandwidth allocated broadband by independent ISPs will not remedy the 
potentially anti-competitive nature of the technical configuration. 
 
Strategic vertical integration  
Allegations arose in the Federal Trade Commission’s review of the AOL-Time 
Warner merger that the newly merged firm could seek to provide Time Warner cable 
customers high-speed Internet access via AOL or RoadRunner ISPs  (owned by AOL 
Time Warner) that discriminated against content owners competing with Time Warner. 
Most prominent in this debate was Disney, a leading broadcaster (as owner of the ABC 
television network) and cable network (owner of ESPN, the Disney Channel,  etc.) 
supplier.
75 The result was that the FTC imposed conditions on the merger mandating that 
AOL not only allow independent ISPs use (or resell) their cable broadband access 
facilities, but that AOL not impose any barriers limiting access to content (including web 
sites available uniquely to customers of rival ISPs).  
The incentive of the cable operator to engage in exclusionary conduct is ambiguous. 
Whatever is done to restrict customer access lowers demand for cable broadband service, 
resulting in a lower wholesale price for the cable system owner (here, AOL Time 
Warner).  Unless some gain offsets that loss, no such action will be profit maximizing. 
Such trade-offs are difficult to estimate a priori. Hence, the factual basis for such an 
allegation merits empirical assessment. Judging from three episodes of relevant market 
experience, it appears that broadband providers will not realize gains from anti-
competitive exclusion. 
 
Dial-up ISP Foreclosure 
In the low-speed Internet access market, leading ISPs have attempted to provide 
closed systems. These services discriminated against content provided by non-affiliated 
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firms. In each case, though, the emerging popularity of the Internet has forced firms to 
provide virtually seamless and ubiquitous web access. As Speta writes:  
 
[T]the transformations of Prodigy, CompuServe, and AOL seem 
instructive. Each of those systems began as a closed-content system: users 
dialed into CompuServe, for example, and received only content created 
by or affiliated with CompuServe. B ut, because consumers demanded 
access to all of the information available on the Internet, those providers 




The matter may or may not be as settled as Speta suggests. The market outcomes may 
be at least partly a product of the unbundled telco platform that each of these ISPs rests 
on. With open entry into the resale of local exchange carrier access service by 
independent ISPs, perhaps they are competitively pressured into relaxing restraints on 
customers. While this sounds both plausible and a predicate for extending similar open 
access rules to cable modems, it is not compelling. The dial-up services spent years 
providing restricted access to subscribers while operating on “open” platforms.
77  Access 
restrictions were voluntarily eliminated when the value of unrestricted access rose, driven 
by the rising popularity of the World Wide Web.  
  
Microsoft’s non-discriminatory Internet access through Windows 
So in 1995 [Netscape General Counsel Roberta] Katz began, quietly, to investigate 
the legality of how Microsoft did business... That summer, Katz met with federal 
investigators in Mountain View, where the investigators were clearly more focused on 
the Microsoft Network than on Microsoft’s belated entry into the browser market. 
Initially, they were especially concerned about whether Microsoft’s Network would spell 
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the demise of the reigning king of on-line services, America Online. The Microsoft 
Network, like AOL, would  be a gated community on the Net that one would reach 
through a direct dial-up phone number. They “wanted to evaluate the market for on-line 
services and wanted to know if the Net represented competition to on-line services,” Katz 
remembered.
78 
The Department of Justice investigation that eventually resulted in the famous 
antitrust verdict of 2000 actually began with questions about closed platforms and 
proprietary content restrictions. While charges were never brought on these grounds, it 
was feared that Microsoft would use its dominance in personal computer operating 
systems (i.e., the “Windows monopoly”) to leverage its way into dominance over dial-up 
Internet connections. Like cable television operators, Microsoft controlled a key level of 
the service chain, and in passing through the operating system customers would have to 
settle for whatever Internet access Microsoft deemed to offer them. The idea was 
advanced that not only would MSN, Microsoft’s wholly owned subsidiary, emerge as the 
monopoly ISP, but i t would use this position to dictate consumer content choices. 
Microsoft would limit choices to proprietary services, or charge fees to access non-
Microsoft web sites on the Internet. 
None of this happened. MSN was bundled into Windows, and efficiently distributed 
to millions of purchasers of new computers who found MSN pre-loaded and ready to 
dial-up (usually with a 30 day free trial). But so was AOL. In a deal struck in March 
1996, Microsoft vigorously sought to enlist AOL as a supporter in its browser war 
combat against Netscape. Terms of the AOL-Microsoft alliance included bundling and 
promoting AOL dial-up access with Windows. The Microsoft executive in charge of 
MSN resigned with news of this deal, as it “sacrificed one child to protect another.”
79 It 
was surely a good career move. AOL subscribership, was then at six million while 
MSN’s stood at 600,000. In 2001, AOL’s paying subscriber base in the United States has 
grown to 22 million, while MSN serves four million, trailing AOL, Earthlink and Juno 
(with ten million free users supplementing its four million paid subscribers).  
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The high value of unrestricted access to web content is what drove Microsoft to 
jettison proprietary content and even befriend rivals of MSN in dial-up service, to engage 
the browser war. Like cable operators, Microsoft could have elected to screen access to 
web content by virtue of its ownership of the gateway (i.e., Windows). Indeed, it 
considered using MSN to steer customers to online services selected cordoned off from 
independent content suppliers. But the value of unfettered Internet access to users became 
apparent by 1995. Hence, Microsoft strategically realigned, expediting convenient web 
access by aggressively distributing free browserware dubbed Internet Exporer, and 
upgrading the functionality of I.E. to compete with Netscape Communicator. 
Similarly, broadband Internet access provided by cable modem service does not 
restrain customers from full access to independent content. While ISPs in dial-up, DSL, 
or cable modem service traditionally pre-install their own websites as default user home 
pages, the user’s cost of switching is trivial. Some cable ISPs do not even provide user 
software, leaving the customer to individually select their own start-up screen as provided 
by Netscape or Microsoft browsers.
80  
 
Cable television systems do not vertically foreclose programming competitors  
Perhaps the best test of how cable operators will behave when deciding how 
customers be allowed to select content via broadband connections is to observe plain old 
cable service. There, cable operators act as program packagers, selecting (and paying 
license fees to) the video networks subscribers may watch. Since cable operators are 
permitted to own cable television networks, the question arises: Do they discriminate 
against content owned by others in filling up the cable channel menu? 
                                                 
80 Co-author Hazlett was surprised to find this arrangement when subscribing to Comcast Cable’s Ex-




























ESPN  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 459.7 11.732% 0.000% 11.732%
Nickelodeon  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 407.8 10.407% 0.000% 10.407%
TNT  100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 285.1 7.276% 7.276% 7.276%
CNN+HN  100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 276.1 7.046% 7.046% 7.046%
TBS  100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 246.4 6.288% 6.288% 6.288%
MTV  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 238.9 6.097% 0.000% 6.097%
Lifetime  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 186.8 4.767% 0.000% 4.767%
Discovery  73.5% 24.5% 98.0% 186.4 4.757% 3.496% 4.662%
USA  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 184.5 4.708% 0.000% 4.708%
Disney  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 175.0 4.466% 0.000% 4.466%
A&E  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 155.9 3.979% 0.000% 3.979%
CNBC  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 143.0 3.649% 0.000% 3.649%
FOX Family  0.0% 49.5% 49.5% 142.5 3.637% 0.000% 1.800%
TNN  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 136.9 3.494% 0.000% 3.494%
BET  35.0% 0.0% 35.0% 89.5 2.284% 0.799% 0.799%
AMC  75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 64.3 1.641% 1.231% 1.641%
Weather  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 61.4 1.567% 0.000% 0.000%
CMT  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 54.1 1.381% 0.000% 1.381%
Sci-Fi  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 46.1 1.176% 0.000% 1.176%
Comedy Central  50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 46.0 1.174% 0.587% 1.174%
VH1  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 45.3 1.156% 0.000% 1.156%
FX  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 44.4 1.133% 0.000% 1.133%
E!  100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 43.7 1.115% 1.115% 1.115%
ESPN2  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 43.6 1.113% 0.000% 1.113%
TLC  73.5% 24.5% 98.0% 40.9 1.044% 0.767% 1.023%
Cartoon  100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 39.3 1.003% 1.003% 1.003%
History  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 18.6 0.475% 0.000% 0.475%
TV Guide  56.0% 44.0% 100.0% 17.1 0.436% 0.244% 0.436%
HGTV  100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 12.4 0.316% 0.316% 0.316%
Bravo  75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 10.2 0.260% 0.195% 0.260%
TCM  100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 8.4 0.214% 0.214% 0.214%
ESPN Classic  0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 4 0.102% 0.000% 0.102%
Court TV  100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 2.3 0.059% 0.059% 0.059%
Golf  42.0% 33.0% 75.0% 1.9 0.048% 0.020% 0.036%
CF WTD. AVG.  30.66% 94.98%
Source: The Economics of Basic Cable Networks 2000, supra note __. 
 




The data suggest otherwise. While cable operators do own a substantial portion of the 
equity in leading basic cable television networks, vertical integration that can be 
explained by scope efficiencies, broadcasters own more than twice as much cable 
content. See Table 3.
81 As Speta notes, there are federally imposed vertical ownership 
limits dating from the 1992 Cable Act: “cable operators are… forbidden to devote more 
than forty percent of their channel capacity to affiliated programmers…”
82 But these rules 
are not binding.  First, total cable ownership (weighted by cash flow) amounts to just 
thirty percent of basic cable channels, comfortably less than the cap. Second, because 
cable network revenues are not uniformly distributed (i.e., the top networks realize far 
more than the less watched networks), the cap at forty percent of capacity would allow 
cable system operators to own networks garnering close to 100 percent of basic cable 




Table 4. Top 5 Cable TV Network Ownership in 1992 
 
Network  Total Net Revenue 
(1992; $millions) 
% owned by 
broadcasters 
% owned by cable 
system operators 
ESPN  553.3  100  0 
CNN/HN  491.4  100  0 
TNT  415.1  100  0 
USA  364.0  100  0 
TBS  256.5  100  0 
Source: 1993 (Carmel, CA: Paul Kagan Associates, 1993), Exec. Sum. 5, Ownership 2. 
 
 
Third, the programming choices of cable operators prior to implementation of the 
1992 Cable Act suggest that legal limits on vertical ownership are not the source of 
cable’s “anti-cable” behavior in selecting content for POC. See Table 4. When there were 
no constraints on cable operator programming choices, the top five basic cable networks 
                                                 
81 In this analysis, cable networks are valued according to cash flows (revenues minus operating costs).  
The networks with higher cash flows are, obviously, more valuable.  If equity were evaluated on an 
unweighted basis, then ownership of low-valued channels would be as important as ownership of highly 
valuable channels. 




were owned entirely by broadcasting interests.
83 Indeed, the major changes in ownership 
of cable networks between 1992 and 2000 are primarily attributable to (1) the acquisition 
of Turner Broadcasting (owner of CNN, TNT, Cartoon, and other cable networks) by 
Time Warner, a cable operator; and (2) the divestiture of cable systems by Viacom 
(owner of CBS, MTV, Showtime, and other program interests).  
That broadcasters effectively own twice as much cable network programming as 
cable system owners is revealing. The two industries aggressively battle for viewing 
audiences. Yet, the product offered by broadcaster––obviously exploiting substantial 
economies of scale in producing mass audience television shows––appeals to cable 
subscribers. Disney is paid a license fee of 93 cents per subscriber per month to supply 
ESPN to its subscribers, substantially more than any other network.
84 Disney owns the 
ABC Television network, and a chain of television stations. It has specifically 
complained that its Internet content is threatened by cable’s “closed” broadband 
platform.
85 On the “closed” plain old cable platform, where content is actually bought 
and paid for by the cable operator as an intermediary, Disney has had little problem 
maintaining access to customers. 
 
5. Cable TV Regulation in Practice 
 
The actual regulatory process merits investigation in the policy debate over access. 
To our knowledge it has received none. This is a curious state of affairs, in that no policy 
is costless to implement. Even were rules guaranteeing access by independent ISPs 
theoretically compelling as a constraint on monopoly power of cable operators, the case 
for access regulation would not be established. It would yet be necessary to demonstrate 
                                                 
83 Cable operators could hardly have exercised discrimination in the remaining channels to make up for 
this “lost opportunity” in paying broadcasters for carriage.  The top five networks accounted for 65.3% of 
aggregate revenues recorded by all 34 basic cable networks listed in Economics of Basic Cable Networks 
1993 (Carmel, CA: Paul Kagan Associates, 1993), Exec. Sum. 5. 
84 Top of the rate card for year 2000.  Economics of Basic Cable Networks 2000, supra note __, 59. 
85 Jim Hu,  Disney asks FCC for restrictions on AOL-Time Warner deal, Bloomberg News (May 11, 
2000),  http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1859769.html); Disney asks Congress to look critically at 
AOL Time Warner (March 23, 2000), CNET News.com,  http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-
1581837.html?tag=bplst);  Disney lobbyist speaks out against AOL, Bloomberg News (Oct. 3, 2000), 




that the actual rules imposed by regulators would likely enhance consumer welfare. The 
unstated assumption of “open access” is that policies can be enacted without cost and 
without error. The record reveals this leap of logic perilous. 
 
Retail rate regulation 
 Regulation of retail cable rates demonstrates a most dubious record. Through federal 
pre-emption of local controls in the 1984 Cable Act, rate re-regulation in the 1992 Cable 
Act, and then deregulation once again (first in a string of FCC decisions beginning in late 
1994 and finally by statute in the 1996 Telecommunications Act), rate controls have 
“worked” to lower nominal rates to customers only by degrading service quality. Most 
importantly, the cost of the quality degradation has exceeded the value of the price 
savings, as revealed in consumer purchasing decisions. This means that cable rate 
controls have proven counter-productive, lowering both consumers’ and producers’ 
surplus.
86  
The dynamic nature of cable television technology and programming helped produce 
this result. Constraints on cable operators force reactions by system owners; at lower 
prices infrastructure and content are not as likely to be created or aggressively marketed. 
One revealing fall-out from rate regulation under the 1992 Cable Act was that the U.S. 
cable industry largely missed an entire capital upgrade cycle. This later slowed industry 
development, retarding opportunities to offer broadband Internet access.
87 This reduction 
in the pace of infrastructure build-out occurred despite the fact that cable systems 





                                                 
86 Robert W. Crandall and Harold Furtchgott-Roth, Cable TV: Regulation or Competition? (Wash. DC: 
Brookings Inst., 1996); Hazlett & Spitzer, supra note 14; Arthur Havenner, Thomas W. Hazlett, and 
Zhiqiang Leng, The Effects of Rate Regulation on Mean Returns and Non-Diversifiable Risk: The Case of 
Cable Television, REV. OF INDUST. ORG. (forthcoming 2001). 
87 “’TCI [the largest U.S. cable system owner] . . . halted most of its capital spending in the early 1990s 




Leased access  
  For three decades the FCC has actually mandated just the third party access now 
demanded by ISPs. The results are nil. The policy of “leased access” is described by 
public interest lawyer and former FCC General Counsel Henry Geller:   
 
In 1969 the FCC announced that provision of leased channels was called 
for “[I]n view of the importance of an informed electorate and speech 
concerning public affairs to self-government, the right of the public to 
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral and other ideas 
and experiences, and the CATV systems’ monopoly position over cable 
access to the subscribers’ premises…” In 1972, the FCC adopted rules 
requiring cable systems with more than 3500 subscribers to make 
available channel capacity for public access (the PEG channels––for 
public, educational and governmental use) and at least one channel for 
leased access, to be offered on a first-come, first-served basis with the 
cable operator having no content control.
88  
 
  Donna Lampert, another former FCC attorney, has written the history of this policy in 
a 1991 monograph entitled, Does Leased Access Mean Least Access? Regulated terms 
and conditions have never attracted third party content for distribution over cable 
television systems, with the exception of scattered home shopping programs and 
infomercials. Attempts by the FCC to remedy this embarrassing state of affairs have been 
cut down by a coalition of cable operators and cable programmers concerned that access 
for individual programs will crowd out channel slots for niche cable networks such as C-
SPAN and Black Entertainment Television.
89  
The leased access policy is directly applicable to broadband. Exactly 6 MHz––one 
video channel in bandwidth––is allocated by cable systems to broadband access. Why 
                                                                                                                                                 
Surprise, Surprise: Cable Rates Fall After Deregulation, BARRON’S (Feb. 28, 2000), (quoting a trade press 
article). 
88 Henry Geller, Fiber Optics: An Opportunity for a New Policy? Report of the Annenberg Washington 
Program, Communication Policy Studies, Northwestern University (1991), 17 (footnotes omitted). 
89 Chris McConnell, Leased-Access Rates Get a Second Look, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Sept. 30, 1996), 




couldn’t an ISP simply request the use of another channel for Internet access? Indeed, 
“The 1984 Cable  Act mandated that 15% of cable spectrum (about 125 MHz) be 
available for commercial use (resale or ‘leased access’).”
90 While previous regulations did 
not specifically consider Internet access, the rules were explicitly crafted to create a non-
discriminatory (common carrier) solution where any unaffiliated programmer could use 
the cable system conduit to reach customers.  
The example given is not hypothetical. Internet Ventures, Inc. (IVI), an ISP with 
30,000 dial-up and 2,000 high-speed subscribers, petitioned the FCC in early 1999 
requesting the opportunity to resell one 6 MHz cable broadband connection under leased 
access rules.
91  President Don Janke noted that, “While ‘open access’ requires new 
regulation for the cable industry, the legal framework for ‘leased access’ already is in 
place in Section 612 of the Communications Act.”
92  The petition received widespread 
support from ISPs, “open access” advocates, and policy makers. Rep. Rick Boucher (D-
Va.), a leading member of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, wrote FCC 
Chairman William Kennard on Feb. 9, 2000: “Independent ISPs now present a major 
source of competition to the programming offered by cable providers. Granting the 
petition would clearly… [provide] greater diversity and competition in the programming 
choices available to consumers.”
93 
The following day the FCC rejected the petition, however, with Kennard dubbing it 
“a square-peg, round-hole problem.”
94 After three decades to prefect leased access, the 
Commission concedes it does not know how to implement such rules in a situation that 
appears tailor made to accomplish “open access” and more––reallocation of radio 
spectrum within the cable television system from subscription video to broadband access. 
 
Video Dialtone/Open Video Systems  
Since 1987 the FCC has pursued the common carrier regulatory model with similarly 
empty results. The initiative begun as Video Dialtone (VDT) was designed to allow 
                                                 
90 Cleland, supra note 18. 
91 Steve Gold, Internet Ventures Files Groundbreaking FCC Petition, NEWSBYTES (June 2, 1999). 
92 As quoted in, “Leased Access” Only Route to Broadband Competition, Following FCC Report on Open 
Access Petition, EDGE, ON & ABOUT AT&T (Feb. 1, 1999). 




LECs, banned from providing in-region cable television service since 1970, back into 
video.
95 While the FCC had initially banned local telephone exchange companies from 
owning cable systems in their exchange territories in order to eliminate incentives for 
anti-competitive conduct against fledgling cable systems (denying access to telephone 
poles, e.g.), the Commission found that once the country had been wired for cable it was 
time to relax the ban to promote new video competition. Phone companies would be free 
to offer such competition -- as providers of transport. Programming would be provided by 
unaffiliated firms leasing capacity over LEC distribution networks. 
After nine years and 851 official filings, the VDT rule making produced a grand total 
of just 1,250 actual subscribers (all in a New Jersey Bell system serving Dover 
Township).
96 In February  1996 the Telecommunications Act mercifully put this paper 
tiger to rest, instituting a new, more liberal approach. Under Open Video System (OVS) 
rules, telcos would be permitted to offer programming to customers, claiming priority on 
up to one-third of the video channels on systems they owned. Third party programmers 
would still have the right to lease channel space on the remaining capacity. This program 
proved wildly popular compared to VDT, and by June 1999 OVS operations were serving 
some 60,000 subscribers (down from the June 1998 high water mark of 66,000). Given 
that about 68 million households subscribe to cable, and another 14 million to satellite or 




Local exchange unbundling 
Local telephone networks are regulated common carriers, and here public policy has 
been most ambitious in creating an “open access” environment. Indeed, much of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act was aimed at dismantling the component parts of local 
telephone systems and offering them––at reasonable cost––to competitors. In creating a 
regulatory mandate for LECs to provide “unbunded network elements” (UNEs) at “any 
                                                                                                                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95 Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-53.58, Further Notice of 
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98 the Act sought to allow competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) to 
serve customers via infrastructure owned and operated by the incumbent local exchange 
carrier (ILEC). The idea was to separate service provision from conduit ownership, 
allowing a monopoly platform to supply competitive services. 
In short, the “open access” concept in cable lifts directly from the UNE regulations in 
telephony. Yet, despite the common carrier status of telephone companies, and a long 
history of regulation to provide guidance in setting cost-based rates, the ambitious 
attempt to promote “reseller competition” has been controversial, litigious, and ultimately 
disappointing. According to recent economic analyses, regulators have simply failed to 
do what is allegedly simple: Provide independent competitors access to monopoly 
infrastructure on the same terms the monopolist offers to its own affiliates.  
Lehman and Weisman note, for example, that UNE rates were set “artificially low,” 
as regulators attempted to implicitly subsidize entrants.
99 Yet these very same competitors 
were damaged when ILECs responded by withdrawing capital inputs. Alfred Kahn, the 
dean of U.S. regulation economists, is even more critical of the policy forcing resale at 
regulated rates. In his 1998 book, Letting Go: Deregulating the Process of Deregulation, 
he details how regulators embraced a protected class, CLECs. Just as Lehman and 
Weisman find, however, the attempt backfires, as critical investments are deterred by fear 
of regulatory appropriation.  
 
Reluctant Regulators 
  The expert agency charged with implementing “open access” rules itself believes that 
regulation is dangerous and unwise. The FCC has denied various requests to impose ISP 
access requirements on cable systems.
100 “Open access” advocates dismiss this stance as 
an aberration: 
 
In our view, this approach profoundly underplays the importance of the 
FCC’s activism in assuring competition in the past, and will jeopardize the 
                                                 
98 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
99  Dale E. Lehman and Dennis L. Weisman, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The ‘Costs’ of 
Managed Competition (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 109. 




innovative prospects for broadband Internet service in the future. It is 
based on a fundamentally misguided  assumption also shared by many 
other commentators: that if we leave the cable industry alone, “the 
market” will take care of the problem.
101 
 
The authors aim to drag the agency, kicking and screaming, to new regulatory 
achievements. Surely, Commission staff  should come to understand how smart and 
effective they really are. But they have a long way to go. A most ironic FCC study, 
published in July 1999, documents the FCC’s key role in creating the Internet––by not 
regulating it.
102 While claiming credit for not creating rules that would have stymied 
network development is provocative, a consensus exists that government has assisted the 
“network of networks” by regulatory forbearance.
103  
If the FCC is to levy new rules, agency officials will shape regulatory outcomes. 
Sweeping away the views of agency officials as unwise and lacking in understanding, and 
then awarding such officials a vast new charge, is not a serious way to implement public 
policy. Rather, a showing as to how administrative controls will produce an improved 
access regime in a reasonable time frame is essential if substantive policy reform is to be 
achieved. How regulators may be forced to implement solutions they believe unwise begs 
explanation. 
 
6. “Open Access” and the Pace of the Race  
 
  The crucial difference between cable and DSL, however, is the degree of 
governmental control over each…DSL is heavily regulated by the FCC…Cable, on the 
other hand, has historically been more loosely regulated by the FCC, and providers have 
not been required to open up their pipe to competitors.
104 
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The aim of access regulation is to assist consumers by limiting cable operators’ 
market power. Some risk is involved, as evinced by warnings that “policy makers should 
be cautious not to let those constraints harm consumers, slow the expansion of affordable 
broadband services, or keep electronic commerce from reaching its potential rate of 
growth.”
105 Two important sources of data are now available to measure the apparent 
consumer trade-offs.  
The first is the rivalry between cable modems and ADSL, the asymmetric flavor of 
DSL,
106 in the so-called bandwidth race. Because cable modem service is provided on a 
“closed” platform, while DSL service is provided via telephone networks kept open by 
extensive unbundling and interconnection regulation, a market test of competing 
paradigms is evident. The second empirical test is yielded by investor reactions to cable 
broadband access regulation. If such rules increase the likelihood of efficient network 
development, content providers and i nfrastructure suppliers should become more 
profitable. Returns in the Internet sector should predict the likely effect of access policies 
themselves in a financial event study. 
 
The Race Between Cable and DSL 
The Starting Line. The current status of the race has, of course, historical origins. 
These seem to favor DSL, whose development is traced to Bellcore in 1989.
107 While 
cable modems were invented about the same time,
108 cable’s distribution network had to 
be upgraded before two-way technologies could be applied. “ADSL... promises to be the 
dominant transmission technology for the first two generations of residential broadband. 
This promise arises from one simple fact––more than 700 million telephone access lines 
populate the world today, a figure moving inexorably to a billion; the only realistic 
alternative, CATV, cannot count even 10 million subscribers presently connected to lines 
                                                 
105 Howard A. Shelanski, The Speed Gap: Broadband Infrastructure and Electronic Commerce, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. (1999).  Shelanski served as FCC Chief Economist, 1999-2000. 
106  Asymmetric Digital Subscriber L ine service allows faster downloads than uplinks, thus saving 
bandwidth for incoming information.  This is tailored to residential subscribers, who use network access 
primarily for email and web surfing.  Business users hosting websites or sending large databases require 
two-way high speed connections. 
107 Maxwell, supra note 37, 231.   




suitable for residential broadband. CATV may catch up, but it will probably not be in 
time.”
109  
  The head start afforded ADSL i s associated with cost. Cable system owners must 
expend about $200 per home passed, or about $300 per cable subscriber, to upgrade their 
plant to be capable of providing cable modem service.
110 At 30% penetration for high-
speed access subscribers––far above  current levels––the capital outlay for system 
upgrade (i.e., not including customer premises equipment or installation) comes to $1,000 
per user. Kim Maxwell notes: “And this money must be spent before connecting a single 
user and comes before the several  hundred dollars needed to actually make the data 
connection. Telephone line-based network service providers will not be spending $1000 
for an entire user connection to an ADSL network and the majority of that cost occurs 
after a service order, not as an investment.”
111 
Cable modems are  winning.  In terms of subscribership, cable modems have 
established a clear lead over DSL. See Figure 6.  This is difficult to ascribe to any natural 
advantages cable broadband enjoys. Industry commentary in the early days of the 
bandwidth race projected DSL the easy winner. In 1997, ZDNet reviewed alternative 
broadband access products and wrote the following: 
 
Cable modems: May want to write the obit on this one. PC Week reports 
vendors are backing away from cable, given competition from digital 
subscriber line technology and cable’s massive implementation headaches. 
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  By 1999, DSL was seen running neck and neck with cable. This was a substantial 
change, as “Only a couple of years ago, xDSL appeared a safe bet as winner.”
113 Industry 
experts such as Cisco CEO John Chambers were quoted saying, “We think it’s an equal 
jump ball between cable and DSL... We don’t think one architecture has an advantage 
over the other.”
114 
  Yet in 2001 analysts see cable as the current and future champion. “Contrary to the 
hype and regulatory hope that DSL would catch up to cable modem deployment, cable 
still is deploying cable modems at roughly two times the rate of DSL in the residential 
market.”
115 In fact, the conventional wisdom is that DSL could have been deployed much 
earlier and more aggressively, but lagged due to the incentives of local exchange 
companies. The emergence of cable modem service is credited with invigorating DSL’s 
development: 
 
The ILEC’s aggressive deployment of DSL can be attributed in large part 
to the deployment of cable modem service. Although the ILECs have 
possessed DSL technology since the late 1980s, they did not offer the 
service, for concern that it would negatively impact their other lines of 
businesses. The deployment of cable modem service, however, spurred the 
ILECs to offer DSL or risk losing potential subscribers to cable. In various 
communities where cable modem service becomes available, the ILECs 
would soon deploy DSL service that was comparable in price and 
performance to the cable modem offering.
116  
 
  All else equal, the “closed platform” should suffer in its marketing efforts vis-a-vis 
the “open platform” of DSL. The consumer advantages of additional choice are clear, as 
is the security offered application developers who need not fear monopsony extractions in 
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supplying content to DSL users. Yet, these advantages are insufficient to produce DSL 
subscription growth matching that of cable modem service. 
 
 
    








































Developments in the capital markets indicate that DSL deployment is not likely to 
soon close the gap with cable modems. In fact, the DSL market is imploding.
117 Despite 
substantial expenditures in time and resources to set rates and terms of wholesale access 
at reasonable, cost-based levels, massive investments are being lost by DSL providers 
today.
118 As shown in Table 5, the leading DSL “pure plays” are currently experiencing 
carnage in the financial markets. Equity shares in the top national DSL suppliers, Covad, 
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Table 5. Equity Returns for National DSL Providers 
 
DSL supplier   Market Cap 
(12-26-00) 
Equity Returns through Dec. 26, 2000  
from close on: 
    12/31/99  3/10/00  8/31/00 
NorthPoint   $41.8 mil.  -98.7%  -98.9%  -97.3% 
Covad   $267.1 mil.  -96.0%  -97.7%  -90.8% 
Rhythms   $64.7 mil.  -97.4%  -98.0%  -91.0% 
Network Access   $35.5 mil.  -97.7%  -97.7%  -90.6% 
Log on America   $4.40 mil.  -97.5%  -96.5%  -84.9% 
Mean (unweighted)   --  -97.5  -97.8  -90.9 
Source: Yahoo!Finance, www.finance.yahoo.com (Dec. 27, 2000). 
 
 
It is apparent that existing business models in DSL have not proven viable, and 
financial analysts are pondering the question: What value does the ISP broadband reseller 
provide? According to one, not much.
119 If this is correct, the implication is that ISP 
service is efficiently bundled with transport––exactly as the leading broadband access 
service (cable) has developed. 
The market for DSL may heroically rebound, and investors may discover a useful 
niche for broadband access resellers. But regulators cannot know that. By imposing an 
extra layer––an artificial middleman––in the vertical chain of production, costs are 
imposed on consumers. Such costs have already become painfully apparent. The NEW 
YORK TIMES recently reported, “that growth in the number of D.S.L. subscribers slowed 
in the third quarter [2000] from the previous three months, and was outpaced by the 
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to competitively offer branded high-speed access over closed systems controlled by AOL-Time Warner, or 
by AT&T and the cable ISP it controls through  Excite@Home.  It’s that they have been unable to 
effectively compete with media and content companies such as Yahoo!, Lycos, the “original” Excite, and 
AOL in providing higher-margin, non-access services worth blinking and clicking at, even over the open 
telco system during dial-up’s heyday.“The hard, historical reality of the ISP is that it hasn’t evolved into 
more than an ISP.  There are no regulations the feds can impose, or terms that the cablecos could offer, 
that would change that in any meaningful  way.”  Nico Detourn, Is Open Access Enough?  




growth of cable subscribers.”
120 This market test of alternative regulatory models is 
revealing, particularly as,  “it is clear that some of the [DSL] industry’s woes are derived 
from the confusion inherent in the way competitors relate to one another.”
121 The TIMES 
quotes a market expert who surmises that the regulatory model imposed on DSL is 
failing: 
 
“The F.C.C. has put all of these companies in the same weird house,” said 
Mike Lowe, an analyst with Cahner In-Stat. “No one takes ownership for 
problems while competitive entities are focused on continuous customer 
acquisition. It’s generated mayhem.”
122 
 
  The economic costs associated with forced vertical disintegration answer the assertion 
by Lemley & Lessig that “The only argument we have been able to find suggesting that 
eliminating ISP competition might actually be desirable is that eliminating such 
competition gives cable companies supracompetitive revenues, and that those revenues 
will encourage them to deploy broadband access more quickly.”
123 While dismissing 
efficiencies lowering risk and speeding capital deployment as “supracompetitive” profits 
evinces a misunderstanding of consumer welfare analysis, it is also clear that consumer 
advantages can accrue from vertical integration. 
Bundling is efficient. Not only is the bundled cable package (ISP connection tied 
to broadband conduit access) winning a race against unbundled DSL competitors, 
broadband access suppliers lacking market power tie services. RCN, the leading cable 
overbuilder, bundles transport and service from its own ISP, called RCN.com. It has 
acquired independent ISPs and rebranded them with its own name. According to a GAO 
report, fixed wireless providers of broadband will also likely provide bundled transport 
and ISP services.
124 Similarly, Echostar selected MSN as the exclusive ISP for its 
                                                 
120  Simon Romero, D.S.L. Service for Linking to Internet is Problem Ridden, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 
2000), www.nytimes.com2000/12/28/technology/28PHON.html. 
121  Ibid. 
122  Ibid. 
123 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 4, 43. 
124 General Accounting Office (GAO), Telecommunications: Technological and Regulatory Factors 





125 Hughes Electronics has modified the model, venturing with 
Earthlink to provide Internet service to rural areas,
126 while maintaining a similar 
relationship with Juno under Hughes’ DirecPC service,
127 and partnering with AOL, 
which purchased a $1.5 billion stake in Hughes in 1999. AOL has agreed to offer its 
interactive TV and ISP to set-top boxes via Hughes’ service.
128 This multi-pronged foray 
enlisting the three largest U.S. ISPs rejects exclusivity, but falls far short of unbundling 
the platform for commodity resale.  
 
Problems encountered in broadband “open access” help explain the popularity of 
bundled service. Though independent ISPs have done well offering low-speed dial-up 
service, they have encountered difficulties provisioning high-speed DSL. Complaints are 
endemic. 
129 As a trade journal recently reported: 
 
Self-appointed consumer advocacy groups are holding public meetings and 
filing lawsuits over the quality and availability of digital subscriber line 
service. CLECs and ISPs are pointing to the closing doors of their own 
operations and crying out––sometimes successfully––that the ILECs still 
aren’t playing fair. 
 
It’s unclear how seriously the protests are being taken, or that they will ever 
amount to more than fragmented gripes. But the highly public nature and 
media coverage of these complaints raise the possibility that over time the 
                                                 
125 Steve Caulk, Echostar Offers New Service via Satellites, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Nov. 6 , 
2000) 10B. 
126 Technology Briefly, LA TIMES (Nov. 16, 2000), C3. 
127 Michael Bartlett,  Analyst Praises EarthLink's Satellite Broadband Internet Access,  NEWSBYTES 
(Nov.16, 2000), http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/158280.html.                  
128 Sallie Hofmeister, AOL May Be Contender in Purchase of DirecTV, LA TIMES (Dec. 13, 2000), C1; 
Steven Abraham and Mark Bunzel, Satellite's Broadband Star Rises, PricewaterhouseCoopers,  
http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/indissue.nsf/docid/ C0E6F86741ABF8B3852567D00069580B. 
129 “It gets tiresome to see, but hardly a week goes by that I don’t read yet another local or national news 
report about somebody’s lousy experience with DSL: The lengthy wait for provisioning.  The problems 
with connections that go down and aren’t brought backup again, and the ‘not me’ response by the involved 
LEC, ISP and DLEC when that happens.  The cutoff  without warning of service to ISP customers when a 
service providers (Jato, recently) goes belly up.... The results of this yawning gap between selling service 




incumbents could have more of a problem on their hands than they realize: An 
increasingly bitter customer base, that combined with broadband competition 
and lingering technical glitches could hamper DSL deployment.
130 
 
Economists have in fact recognized quality assurance as a rationale for bundling, and 
the courts have endorsed those rationales, especially for new products.
131 For example, 
franchisors may stipulate that franchisees purchase inputs from specific suppliers to 
protect the reputation of the franchise. Given the potential for service problems that the 
consumer cannot easily attribute to the ISP versus than the transport provider, cable 
companies have three options.  First, they can provide certification and monitoring of 
ISPs. This involves costs and errors, and raises the possibility that individual ISPs will 
not fully bear the losses accruing from deficient service. Second, the cable companies can 
executive preferential agreements with one or a small number of ISPs, stating quality 
control mechanisms and using the threat of termination to police ISP behavior. Finally, 
they can vertically integrate into ISP provision. Absent the pressure for “open access,” 
the second and third options seem to be the natural path regardless of delivery 
mechanism––DSL, cable, fixed wireless or satellite. 
Aside from quality assurance and ease of troubleshooting, bundled provision also 
enhances the possibilities for price discrimination. Customer fees may depend on the 
number of e-mail addresses supplied, the amount of disk storage leased, and the extent of 
web-hosting services, etc. Simple transport offers fewer dimensions to price. In a static 
world, the implications for consumer welfare are unclear. In a dynamic world marked by 
technological and strategic uncertainties, the extra profits are likely to generate incentives 
for new applications, network expansion, and faster deployment of capital infrastructure. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
cable, which itself is no day at the beach when it comes to trouble-free service.”  Bill Menezes, Are You 
Being Served?  BROADBAND WEEK (Jan. 22, 2001), 5. 
130 Evan Blackwell, DSL Groundswell: Winter of Discontent Could Get Ugly, BROADBAND WEEK (Feb. 
19, 2001), 1. 
131 Benjamin Klein and L ester F. Saft,  The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. L. 
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Financial Market Reactions to “Open Access” Events 
The Metrics  
Internet Index. We examine an index that covers a broad swath of Internet players. 
The portfolio employed is the Inter@ctiveWeek Internet Index.
132 Events studied include 
actions by companies (such as merger announcements) and by regulators (such as merger 
approvals or access rule decisions) that impact Internet development generally and 
companies in the Internet Index specifically. Actions or policies expected to facilitate 
faster, cheaper, better network connectivity benefit shareholders of Amazon.com, Cisco, 
E*Trade, Cnet, 3Com, Yahoo, and other components of the index. This should be evident 
in higher share prices, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, shares of these companies 
decline on news interpreted by investors to result in negative marginal growth effects for 
high-speed networks.
133 
Excite@Home. We also look at Excite@Home’s stock price, using it as a bellwether 
for the effects of the “open access” debate. Excite@Home has exclusive contracts with a 
number of cable companies, including AT&T, Cablevision, Comcast and Cox 
Communications. Some of these contracts expire in 2002, others later. “Forced access” 
would undo this business model. Hence, the firm’s shares are directly impacted by the 
policy outcome and should signal important steps in policy enactment. 
Financial analysts and the business press have repeatedly l inked Excite@Home’s 
stock price and shifts in the “open access” debate. Following the June 4, 1999 circuit 
court decision favoring Portland’s push for “open access”, CNET reported: “Wall Street 
reacted markedly to the court's decision. Stock in @Home slipped more than 10 percent 
to close at 94.5. ISPs Mindspring and AOL both posted significant gains today, largely 
                                                 
132 “The Inter@ctive Week Internet Index is designed to measure a cross section of companies involved in 
providing digital interactive services, developing and marketing digital interactive software and 
manufacturing digital interactive hardware. The Inter@ctive Week Internet Index was developed by the 
American Stock Exchange a nd  Inter@ctive Week, a biweekly magazine published by Inter@ctive 
Enterprises L.L.C. The Index is market-value (capitalization) weighted.” Source:   
http://www.mobydata.com/comp/iix.htm. 
133 Included in the Internet Index are: Akamai, Critical Path, Level 3, Scient Corp., Amazon.com, Cisco, 
Network Associates, Sportsline.com, AOL, Doubleclick, Novell, Starmedia, Ariba, Ebay, Open Market, 
Sun Microsystems, At Home Corp., Egghead.com, Palm, Tibco Software, Broadcom, E*Trade, 
Priceline.com, Travelocity, Broadvision, Earthlink, Psinet, Verticalnet, Check Point Software, Exodus 
Communications, Qwest, Vignette Corp., Checkfree Corp., Internet Cap, Qualcomm, Vocaltec, CMGI, 
Inktomi, RealNetworks, Verisign, Cnet, Intuit, RSA Security, Webmethods, 3Com, Juniper Networks, 




coming late in the afternoon following the news.”
134 In response to the same ruling, an 
Excite@Home VP said, "It is bad public policy. It will only upset the financial markets, 
which it's already doing when you look at what's happening with cable stocks and our 
stock."
135 
Industry analysts routinely mention the “open access” debate and its ramifications in 
explaining Excite@Home’s stock price decline i n 2000, which slid 80 percent from 
February through December. According to analyst Drake Johnstone, “The market is 
concerned about open access. AOL and Time Warner said they will open their lines to 
companies, and AT&T will follow suit after their deal ends with Excite@Home. This 
means more competition that will likely pose a threat to growth.” 
136 Morningstar agreed: 
“The open-access cable debate is still simmering, and the company [Excite@Home] will 
be strongly affected by pending regulatory decisions.”
137  
 
AOL. In addition to the Internet index and Excite@Home, we also track AOL’s stock 
price. The link between “open access” and AOL’s stock price is more subtle than for 
Excite@Home. Until the January 2000 announcement of the Time Warner merger, AOL 
had an interest in regulating access to high-speed cable networks. Its interests were 
diametrically opposed to Excite@Home’s.  Since January 2000, AOL has (in the 
forward-looking sense important to shareholders) become a cable company and owner of 
RoadRunner, an ISP with exclusive contracts to provide cable modem service over 
systems owned by Time Warner. Presumably, in a world of first bests, AOL would have 
found Excite@Home’s strategy more attractive. Indeed rumors had circulated in 1999 
that AOL would buy Excite@Home.  However, to secure regulatory approval, AOL and 
Time Warner have agreed to open up the merged entity’s cable systems to competing 
ISP’s, starting with Mindspring. This arrangement has value as precedent for the “open 
                                                 
134 Corey, Grice, Oregon Ruling May Fuel Open Access Fight, CNET NEWS.COM (June 4, 1999). 
135 Comment by Excite@Home senior vice president, Dan Gilbert. Corey Grice, Excite@Home tries to 
debunk ISP claims, CNET NEWS.COM (June 16, 1999). 
136 Quoting analyst Drake Johnstone, Corey Grice, Stock in Excite@Home flirts with new 52-week low, 
CNET NEWS.COM (March 8, 2000). 
137  George E. Nichols,  Excite@Home Issues Disappointing Results,  MORNINGSTAR  (April 20, 2000),  




access” debate. Recent commentary suggests that AOL Time Warner’s interests in the 
“open access” debate may in fact have switched a second time––back to favoring it.
138 
An extra complication arises because it is unclear whether the Time Warner 
acquisition was AOL’s best strategic choice. The stock market reacted poorly to AOL’s 
January 10, 2000 announcement of the deal, marking its stock down 18 percent in the 
three days following. If that market reaction continued to be a correct assessment of the 
deal’s impact on AOL, developments that raised the likelihood of the deal collapsing 
would arguably have boosted AOL’s stock. One could argue that AOL’s success as a 
dial-up ISP has been based on its exploitation of installed base made available at cross-
subsidized, regulated rates. Hence, it is not clear whether the push for “open access” by 
opponents of the deal helped or hurt AOL’s prospects in the eyes of investors. 
 
The Events 
Setbacks for “open access.” The cause of “open access” has suffered a number of 
setbacks over the past three years. First, there were the mergers, notably AT&T’s 
acquisitions of the cable companies TCI and MediaOne. Critics charged that AT&T 
would exclude independent ISP’s from its broadband network. Other mergers also looked 
like attacks on the “open access” idea.  For example, the fusion of Excite and @Home 
seemed to strengthen a company whose business model for high-speed service was based 
on exclusive contracts with cable companies. 
The second setback occurred at the local level. Governments in Portland, San 
Francisco and elsewhere have considered “open access” and either rejected it or failed to 
prevail in the courts when attempting to impose it. 
Finally, the Federal Communications Commission has so far refused to mandate 
“open access.” It has argued that broadband is new and its future uncertain. Its position 
has been that regulation at such an early point might reduce investment and prevent the 
emergence of product packages that will appeal to consumers. 
 
                                                 
138 Edmund Sanders, AOL-Time Warner Deal Could, Ironically, Lead to Open Access, LA TIMES (Nov. 
16, 2000), C1. The article describes an FCC filing by Comcast and Cox Communications that warned about 
deleterious effects from anticipated AOL Time Warner merger terms being imposed on other cable 




Victories for “open access.” “Open access” was the single most i mportant policy 
issue in the AOL/Time Warner deal, first announced in January 2000.  The FTC 
approved the deal in December 2000 on condition that AOL not offer its own high-speed 
Internet service over Time Warner cable systems until offering consumers the choice of 
independent high-speed ISP’s (one prior to AOL’s initiation of service, and two more 
within 90 days). (FCC approval came in January 2000 and did not deal with the cable 
modem access issue.) 
In the AOL/Time Warner merger and elsewhere, powerful interests continue to back 
“open access.” Those interests include the regional bell operating companies which offer 
DSL––a competitor to cable––but which must operate under federal line-sharing 
requirements and wholesale price control.  Other players weighing in on “open access” 
include Microsoft, NBC (owned by General Electric), and Disney. Microsoft fears that its 
MSN Internet service won’t be among the chosen few featured by cable companies. In 
the case of the AOL/Time Warner deal, NBC and Disney fear that AOL/Time Warner 
will be block or hamper delivery of their content over AOL/Time Warner pipes. Other 
cable providers fear that the combined entity will try to keep its content out of competing 
broadband delivery systems. Thus, objections based on “open access” offered a line of 
defense against a different sort of competitive threat. As mentioned above, with “open 
access” imposed on AOL Time Warner, that company may itself emerge again as a 
leading proponent, particularly for overbuilders, satellite and fixed wireless providers. 
 
Results 
Setbacks for “open access.” Table 6 shows 21 dates and summary descriptions of 
events that arguably mark setbacks for the cause of “open access.” These include 
announcements of mergers and favorable developments for a variety of mergers, 
including AT&T’s purchase of cable operators TCI and MediaOne. Also included are 
various rumored deals that never took place, notably linkups of AOL and Excite@Home, 
and AT&T and Time Warner. Finally, this group of events also includes legal and 
political setbacks such as a Miami city council ruling in favor of the cable companies and 
the June 22, 2000 appeals court ruling that struck down Portland, Oregon’s local access 




The net returns for the Internet Index, Excite@Home and AOL  are adjusted for 
movements in the S&P 500 index. The first of each pair of returns shows the net 
percentage increase on the event date shown. The second shows the net percentage 
increase on the day before, the day of, and the day after [-1, 0, +1]. 
Over the 21 dates, the mean net increase in the Internet index was 1.1 percent over 
one day and 1.7 percent over three days. The median returns were similarly positive (0.7 
and 2.4 percent over one and three days).  The t -statistics show that the means are 
statistically significant and positive. The net effect, though subject to important caveats, 
can be calculated. Cumulatively, investors marked up Internet stocks by 24.6 percent on 
the 21 event dates. Over the three-day windows, the cumulative return was 41.6 percent.  
Unsurprisingly, Excite@Home reacted strongly to the setbacks for “open access.” The 
mean increase over one day was 7.6 percent. Over three days, the mean increase was 8.1 
percent. Again, the results were statistically significant.  The cumulative effect over one 
day was 364 percent, and over three days 409 percent. 
Lastly, the AOL reaction was more muted, and though positive on average, not 
statistically significant. Interestingly, AOL declined in value on some key dates: (1) the 
June 24, 1998 announcement of the AT&T / TCI merger, (2) the February 17, 1999 FCC 
approval of the same deal, (3) the April 12, 1999 story covering a Senate subcommittee’s 
tepid reception to ISP arguments on “open access” for cable, (4) San Francisco’s 
approval of the transfer of TCI’s cable franchise to AT&T, (5) the February 16, 2000 
decision by Pennsylvania to shelve consideration of “open access” requirements for cable 
networks. 
Victories for “open access.” We were able to identify only eight stories with positive 
implications for open or forced access. See Table 7. They include the initial federal 
district court decision upholding Portland’s “open access” requirement, votes in Broward 
County and Pittsburgh, and news stories on the AOL/Time Warner deal suggesting that 
an “open access” requirement would enacted. Arguably, the ground shifted toward open 
or forced access more than this ratio of 21 “anti-open access” to eight “pro-open access” 
dates suggests.  
Positive developments for “open access” were marked by essentially u nchanged 




access.” This stands in contrast to our earlier results on setbacks for “open access.”  
Excite@Home investors took a dimmer view of “open access,” sending shares down 4.9 
percent over one day and 6.4 percent over three days. This suggests that these eight dates 
were in fact significant for the “open access” debate. AOL’s experience was again mixed, 
even perhaps negative. AOL share prices rose sharply with the June 4, 1999 Portland 
ruling in favor of “open access” (up 7.9 percent). They generally responded negatively to 
news revealing obstacles to the AOL Time Warner merger. 
These results show no positive effect for Internet stocks as a whole, yet submit to a 
variety of interpretations. First, we may not have identified a sufficiently complete set of 
events. Second, investors may not be savvy about what is good for development of the 
Internet. This is a tempting argument against the background tech stock boom-and-bust, 
but ultimately unsatisfying. Even if investors are too optimistic or pessimistic in general, 
targeted reactions should rationally assess new information.  Third, the list of Internet 
companies omits many, including those firms yet unborn, to benefit from “open access.”   
Most plausible in our view is the interpretation that the push for “open access” is 
fraught with downside risk. Given likely efficiencies in vertical integration, at least 
through the tumultuous build-out phase of investment in broadband n etworks, forced 
disintegration may prove disruptive. There are also political costs associated with “open 
access,” as rules generate rent-seeking. In particular, access rules necessitate regulatory 
oversight of wholesale pricing, setting up a battle for transfers between incumbent 
operators and independent ISPs. The expected result would include not only price 
controls, but rules governing quality of transport service and constraining cable operators 
in multiple dimensions.  That investors in firms that benefit from enhanced broadband 
network development show no enthusiasm for such regulations is evidence that such rules 
are not viewed by investors as likely to create efficiencies. 53 
Table 6. Events signaling setbacks for “open access”, Jan 1998–Oct 2000 
     Internet Index 
 
Excite@Home  AOL 
     One-day  Three-day  One-day  Three-day  One-day  Three-day 
24-Jun-98 AT&T/TCI announced, Cnet  0.2%  1.5%  27.9%  24.5%  -4.2%  2.9% 
10-Dec-98 Rumors of AT&T/ Time Warner deal  1.7%  4.2%  9.7%  10.3%  -0.5%  3.6% 
31-Dec-98 ATT Passes Hurdle in plan to buy TCI, NYT  2.0%  2.4%  4.3%  3.6%  5.6%  -1.6% 
19-Jan-99 AtHome/Excite deal  3.2%  -1.8%  11.6%  0.0%  1.5%  -3.4% 
17-Feb-99 FCC gives green light to AT&T/TCI  -1.4%  -5.2%  7.4%  -5.1%  -1.6%  -2.7% 
22-Mar-99 Comcast bid for MediaOne  1.6%  3.6%  5.0%  19.5%  9.3%  11.9% 
12-Apr-99 ISPs get bad reception at FCC cable hearing  0.6%  2.9%  8.1%  11.2%  -2.6%  -1.5% 
22-Apr-99 AT&T makes competing bid for MediaOne, NYT  0.9%  7.1%  -1.1%  10.3%  1.3%  7.4% 
16-Jun-99 FCC chief urges localities to keep hands of interent, San Jose 
Mercury News 
4.4%  6.1%  13.7%  21.3%  8.6%  15.1% 
27-Jul-99 SF OK's deal AT&T/TCI (but imposes “open access”)  -0.5%  -1.7%  8.0%  8.1%  -3.8%  -5.6% 
11-Aug-99 FCC declines to start formal probe of broadband  0.6%  4.0%  -1.0%  3.6%  6.0%  8.3% 
17-Aug-99 FCC asserts right to regulate cable  1.4%  4.5%  2.0%  7.3%  1.0%  1.8% 
29-Sep-99 Rumor of AOL buying Excite@Home - Fortune Street Life 
9/29/99 
2.3%  1.9%  15.4%  8.8%  1.3%  3.4% 
19-Oct-99 Miami rules in favor of cable cos, Boston Globe  0.7%  -1.7%  4.2%  -1.7%  3.7%  2.4% 
8-Nov-99 Rumors of AOL buying Excite@Home, Business Wire  2.8%  5.7%  13.6%  18.6%  2.5%  1.0% 
16-Feb-00 Pennsylvania Lawmakers Shelve Bill on Cable Access for Internet 
Firms 
0.9%  1.9%  -2.7%  8.2%  -2.4%  -4.7% 
9-May-00 Excite names new chair, NYT; Rumored Com cast bid for ATHM 
(Stockrumours.com, also CNNfn) 
0.0%  -5.1%  15.7%  13.4%  2.0%  0.1% 
26-May-00 DOJ approves AT&T/MediaOne deal, NYT  -0.1%  2.5%  -3.9%  -5.0%  -1.6%  2.1% 
5-Jun-00 FCC approves AT&T/MediaOne, NYT  0.2%  4.3%  -4.1%  -5.7%  -2.4%  4.3% 
22-Jun-00 Sprint/WorldCom opposed by EU; Appeals Court Ruling on 
Seattle - Cable is not telecom 
0.0%  -2.2%  14.0%  5.8%  1.4%  -3.7% 
19-Oct-00 Excite, Comcast, AT&T, Cox and Radio Shack team up, PR 
Newswire 
0.4%  0.0%  11.4%  12.0%  -9.0%  1.0% 
  Mean  1.1%  1.7%  7.6%  8.1%  0.8%  2.0% 
   Median  0.7%  2.4%  8.0%  8.2%  1.3%  1.8% 
   Cumulative  24.6%  41.6%  364.2%  408.6%  17.1%  51.4% 





Table 7. Events signaling victories for “open access”, Jan 1998-Oct 2000 
      Internet Index 
 
Excite@Home  AOL 
      One-day  Three-day  One-day Three-day  One-day  Three-day
4-Jun-99 Portland judge upholds “open access”; Wash 
Post, 6/5 
  0.9%  -0.1%  -14.7% -14.8%  7.9%  -0.1%
13-Jul-99 Broward County votes for nondiscriminatory 
access 
  0.6%  -1.2%  -2.2% -8.6%  3.0%  -3.4%
28-Dec-99 Pittsburgh mandates “open access”; PR 
Newswire 
  -0.4%  2.9%  1.1% -0.9%  -2.8%  -4.9%
25-Jul-00 NBC opposses AOL/TW union, Cnet    0.9%  0.1%  -3.8% -7.2%  -2.3%  -4.1%
27-Jul-00 FCC vows scrutiny of AOL merger WP, 
July 28 
  -3.4%  -2.7%  -5.8% -8.1%  1.7%  3.3%
6-Oct-00 Limits may soon emerge for AOL deal, 
NYT 
  -0.1%  0.3%  -9.1% -4.4%  -0.6%  1.4%
16-Oct-00 Bad Bongos for AOL/TW, Cable World    1.6%  3.0%  -4.3% -1.2%  -0.8%  -16.6%
10-Nov-00 AOL/TW shares dip on concerns about deal 
closing, Reuters, ZD Net 
  -1.1%  -3.2%  -0.6% -5.9%  0.0%  -5.3%
             
  Mean    -0.1%  -0.1%  -4.9% -6.4%  0.8%  -3.7%
  Median    0.3%  0.0%  -4.0% -6.6%  -0.3%  -3.8%
  Cumulative    -1.0%  -1.0%  -33.2% -41.0%  6.2%  -26.1%










Related to the financial event study performed above, it is instructive to observe 
analyst sentiment. Financial institutions routinely evaluate public policy measures in an 
effort to predict how regulatory changes will impact investments. In one such recent 
study devoted specifically to the issue of cable open access, Deutsche Bank noted that 
“entire sectors’ valuations hinge on the existence of high-speed links from the Internet to 
the home.”
139 It appraised the policy options and rendered a financial judgment as to how 
“open access” in cable would alter existing market relationships. This analysis can be 
summarized as follows: 
1.  Open access rules introduce inefficiencies in marketing and service. By 
artificially unbundling the shared networks used for cable modem service, 
access regulation will reduce the ability of cable operators to market high-
speed Internet access and to guarantee quality of service to customers.  
2.  Regulation is unnecessary to prevent content discrimination. “Cable 
operators have no incentive to leverage or control available content 
because the primary attractiveness of the Internet is its wide variety of 
available content.” In any event, “all content on the Internet is only ‘one 
click’ away.”
140 
3.  Open access regulation reduces infrastructure investment. Investors are 
leery of rules which reduce property rights, and “Without exclusion, there 
are likely to be opportunities for others to free ride on the investments and 
marketing efforts of cable operators.”
141 
4.  The “open” DSL platform grew due to “closed” cable modems. “Many 
analysts believe that recent investment in DSL by RBOCs was spurred 
primarily by the competitive threat posed by cable operators.”
142 If “open 
access” rules are imposed, a decline in cable upgrades and a slowing of 
                                                 
139 Cable Open Access Rules: An Analysis of the Debate, Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown (Jan. 18, 2001), 2. 
140 Ibid., 7. 
141 Ibid., 8. 




cable modem penetration would ironically hinder DSL development, as 
telephone companies become “more complacent.”
143 
5.  Cable “open access” raises rivals’ costs.  The primary proponents of 
regulation in this area are ISPs and telephone companies. The latter benefit 
directly from low, regulated terms upon which they can resell cable 
conduit service, but the latter are “in direct competition with cable 
operators in offering broadband access... using DSL technology. As a 
result, RBOCs [local Bell telephone companies] would like cable 
operators to face as difficult a regulatory environment as possible.”
144 
 
All of these conclusions are consistent with the theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence presented above. It is notable that they are presented in an analysis aiming to 
unravel the financial implications of public policy for stock market investors.
145 
 
7. End-to-End vs. Case-by-Case  
 
  Some “open access” advocates stake their policy prescription on the essential 
nature of the Internet. Were cable’s “closed platform” to garner millions of subscribers, it 
would fundamentally alter and eventually undermine the enormous social value of the 
Internet. As Lessig writes:   
 
The argument in favor of open access... has taken hold in Washington. 
And for good reason. Innovation on the Internet has been fueled by a 
platform that is neutral among innovators. This neutrality, embodied in the 
network principle of end-to-end (build intelligence in the ends, while 
keeping the network itself simple), encourages the widest range of creators 
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to develop new content and applications on the Internet. The danger of 
closed access––where the platform owner has the power to control which 
innovations are permitted and which are not––is the potential for strategic 
action by owners of the network that could dampen the eagerness of 
innovators to develop for the Net. Open platforms keep players honest.
146 
 
The categorical argument that networks limiting access reduce social welfare is 
demonstrably false. Some benefits flow from the creation of open environments, but 
benefits may also be created in solutions limiting access to one degree or another. The set 
of trade-offs is large, their evaluation complex. Optimizing social value requires a mix 
that recognizes where openness is appropriate and where proprietary restrictions make 
sense. A simple rule forbidding all but entirely open systems would damage consumers 
by dramatically reducing both infrastructure investment and Internet functionality. 
One good example of this complexity concerns the hardware devices that enable 
customers to create a broadband connection. The unregulated status of cable’s “closed” 
platform has assisted the development of equipment standards that allow greater 
competitive access for rival manufacturers. The cable industry has aggressively promoted 
coordinated standards through its research consortium, CableLabs, and its cable modem 
standards initiative, OpenCable. Quality and price competition are encouraged, as 
CableLabs’ certification of modems and other equipment assure compatibility. The result 
is an open platform on which a vibrant emerging market for cable broadband hardware 
thrives. 
Despite regulated access, the telephone broadband platform lags behind. Cable “has 
already achieved significant success at developing standards that will bring down costs 
and expand the range of attractive products and services for cable.”
147 Hampered by 
regulation, DSL providers do not enjoy sufficient flexibility to craft such investment-
creating devices. “Without a central coordinating body such as CableLabs, hamstrung by 
much tighter regulatory requirements for open interfaces and nondiscriminatory access, it 
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is highly unlikely that DSL will attain as favorable a standards position a cable anytime 
soon.”
148 Opening some access via regulation closes others. 
  As a goal, “end-to-end” provides guidance but no answers; structural choices must be 
considered in light of the costs and benefits of alternative system architectures.
149 This is 
quite apparent in cable broadband. Mandating “open access” for ISPs attempting to 
connect customers to the Internet may benefit subscribers who prefer independent ISP X 
over cable-owned ISP Y. Yet, a policy forcing the cable system to drop its exclusive 
agreement with ISP Y may require bandwidth partitioning or performance adjustments 
that reduce average download speeds by Z%.
150 There is no way to categorically establish 
whether the gain in value from a non-exclusive, “open” ISP access policy is fully offset 
by the loss in transport functionality. That is why end-to-end is only as good an 
organizing principle as case-by-case analysis shows it to be.
151 
  The evidence suggests that cable’s “closed” platform has helped promote high-speed 
access subscribership (see previous section). The trade-offs often tilt in favor of limiting 
access to enhance performance. Rules that retard infrastructure investment or service 
penetration restrict functionality, harming consumers. While opening networks “end-to-
end” may be worthwhile at a low price, sacrificing more valuable opportunities to do so 
is inefficient. If the facts show that customer preferences do not strongly favor one ISP 
over another, that the most popular ISPs would not be excluded by “closed” cable 
systems, that marketing new broadband services is best with “one-stop shopping” 
solutions to minimize supplier coordination failures, or that $31 billion in cable system 
upgrades will take place more expeditiously when integrated ISPs are involved in the 
build-out, the case for mandated access fades. While access regulations may yet be 
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salvaged by a showing of net consumer benefit,
152 they cannot be plausibly advanced by 
a categorical assertion that “open” is superior to “closed.” 
  It is not. Closed networks are vitally important, and productive, elements in the 
network of networks. Corporate local area networks are perhaps the most prominent 
example. Having millions of firms, and their workers, connected to the Internet through a 
series of private gateways, firewalls, and “closed” Ethernets does not damage the Internet 
but broadens it. Ironically, America Online’s 23 million dial-up subscribers may form the 
best example. Even as these web participants spend 70% of their online time browsing 
AOL content unavailable to those outside their network,
153 they contribute enormously to 
the Internet’s social value. Had AOL been prohibited from offering private content, it is 
likely that fewer people would own computers, fewer computer users would be online 
today, and that America Online would not have been nearly so profligate in marketing the 
web to millions of novice users (“carpet bombing” America with 250 million sign-up 
CDs
154). 
  The Internet’s social value is not depreciated but is enhanced when market 
competitors consider a range of efficient solutions in extending access speed and capacity 
for users. Indeed, Internet growth is increasingly driven by the demand to bypass 
congested links, routing network traffic to systems where enhanced speed, capacity, and 
applications are made available due to gateways and toll booths limiting access. 
Rationing demand via a fee that pays for upgraded service allows better user control and 
faster transport. 
  This is the nature of cable modem service. No Internet user is “enclosed” by cable 
modems. Rather, the cable modem opportunity draws subscribers away from dial-up 
service over the “open access” public switched telephone network. See Figure 7.
155 For 
some, this is a bargain. For others, dial-up is sufficient and priced right. This is hardly a 
distortion of Internet functionality, but a distinct advance in functionality for subscribers 
which is why they are willing to pay higher rates to access broadband links. The 
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advanced communications capability cable broadband brings to such users combines with 







Figure 7. Internet Architecture + CATV Bypass 
 
 
  The policy question is: Would “open access” rules increase net benefits? That entails 
an examination of the gains from ISPs competing to resell cable modem service, the costs 
of regulation to adjudicate mandated access disputes, and dynamic impacts––increases or 
decreases in investments and innovations improving the network. It is simply not the case 
that “open” solutions dominate “closed” solutions in their dynamic effects. As powerful 
as our network effects from widespread interconnection of networks forming the Internet, 
incentives to build and improve networks and applications are often enhanced by vertical 
integration, exclusive service contracts, proprietary applications, or limited network 
access.  
In sum, the technical properties of “end-to-end” architecture do not, and cannot, 
resolve the cable modem ISP access question. Integrating transport service with the ISP 
CATV 




connection does not foreclose communication with subscribers, just as the walled areas of 
AOL do not challenge the Internet’s structural integrity. Indeed, by facilitating ways for 
open and closed networks to grow and prosper, the Internet expands its reach, “end-to-
end.”
156  
Limiting the decentralized choices of network providers would ironically undermine 
this development. Rather than  promoting “end-to-end” and respecting the organizing 
principle of Internet communications, cable “open access” regulation would impose a 
particular architecture on networks, eliminating the discretion of network creators.
157 This 
is inimical to the spontaneous development of the “network of networks,” as it would 
force design requirements on the system rather than allowing networks to design their 
own standards and architectures. Cable operators who experiment with alternative ISP 
arrangements do not violate “end-to-end.” Their network traffic interconnects using the 
standard protocols. The violation of “end-to-end” principles lies in top-down enforcement 
of rules dictating the architecture of individual networks: 
 
In direct contrast to claims made by the advocates of open access rules, 
opponents of such rules argue they would entrail regulation that results in 
the demise of the “end-to-end” principles governing the Internet. Instead 
of the currently decentralized network, cable access rules would be a big 
step towards putting development of the Internet, and the resulting 






Market power plagues local cable television markets, and this bleeds into the 
emerging market for broadband access. Cable operators could pursue an economically 
efficient path, transitioning from multi-channel video to Internet on-ramp provider. Yet 
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they fear regulatory appropriation. Pressure to treat cable systems as common carriers 
would intensify as cable operators shifted from packagers of video channels (electronic 
publishers) to suppliers of network access (platform providers). This would subject 
infrastructure owners to extensive rate regulation and other controls long resisted by the 
industry. It is not shocking, perhaps, that the business model touted by “open access” 
advocates as optimal is the one most feared by network owners, but the source of that 
fear is ironic. It is the cost and limitations of common carrier regulation and vertical 
disintegration that drives cable operators to resist a natural migration to an integrated 
broadband platform.  
The “open access” rules proposed in the current policy debate do not strike at the 
monopoly element in broadband access. Bandwidth will not be allocated differently 
within cable television systems under mandated non-discrimination rules for Internet 
Service Providers. The opportunity for independent ISPs to access the same infrastructure 
on identical terms as integrated ISPs leaves market power unmitigated.  Spectrum will 
continue to be overwhelming allocated to video, while broadband starves. Digital cable 
and video-on-demand will soak up the capacity provided by cable system upgrades, as 
these services do not incur the risks associated with the supply of passive transport 
services. Congestion due to limited bandwidth will keep Internet TV a distant prospect.  
While the aims of “open access” will be unfulfilled, substantial regulatory costs will 
likely be incurred. The rules create administrative costs for public and private actors, as 
well as delays and uncertainties impacting investment. The history of cable regulation 
suggests that those costs will dominate any benefits generated. The large lead enjoyed in 
the bandwidth race by cable’s “closed” platform suggests that “open” platforms may be 
less efficient, a conclusion buttressed by financial market evidence indicating that 
investors do not believe “open access” rules are likely to create profitable opportunities 
for Internet content and infrastructure developers.  Difficulties encountered in DSL 
deployment further suggest that vertical integration provides valuable information, 
including quality assurance, to network users. Vertical divestiture by “open access” rules 
augurs to sacrifice economies, retarding investment and network growth.  
                                                                                                                                                 




This view of the likely effect of regulation is supported by two additional sets of self-
interested experts. First, competitive firms providing broadband access to customers 
typically do so via exclusive, or nearly exclusive, ISP agreements. Often these 
agreements are with vertically integrated ISPs. Since such firms have no monopoly 
power to protect, the presumed explanation for such behavior is economic efficiency. 
Second, firms building infrastructure to compete with cable modem service have 
announced strong support for “open access” rules. To advance regulation on their rivals, 
local telephone carriers reveal their appraisal that such rules will slow cable network 
build-out.  This supports the current evidence  that cable modems are winning the 
broadband race due in part to regulatory advantages. 